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ANN M. EISENBERG* 
 The transition to a low-carbon society will have winners and losers as 
the costs and benefits of decarbonization fall unevenly on different 
communities. This potential collateral damage has prompted calls for a “just 
transition” to a green economy. While the term, “just transition,” is 
increasingly prevalent in the public discourse, it remains under-discussed 
and poorly defined in legal literature, preventing it from helping catalyze 
fair decarbonization. This Article seeks to define the term, test its validity, 
and articulate its relationship with law so the idea can meet its potential. 
The Article is the first to disambiguate and assess two main rhetorical 
usages of “just transition.” I argue that legal scholars should recognize it 
as a term of art that evolved in the labor movement, first known as a 
“superfund for workers.” In the climate change context, I therefore define a 
just transition as the principle of easing the burden decarbonization poses 
to those who depend on high-carbon industries. This definition provides 
clarity and can help law engage with fields that already recognize just 
transitions as a labor concept. 
I argue further that the labor-driven just transition concept is both 
justified and essential in light of today’s deep political polarization and 
“jobs-versus-environment” tensions. First, it can incorporate much-needed 
economic equity considerations into environmental decisionmaking. Second, 
it can inform a modernized alternative to the environmental law apparatus, 
which must evolve to transcend disciplines. Third, it offers an avenue for 
climate reform through coalition-building between labor and environmental 
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interests. I offer guidance for effectuating the principle by synthesizing 
instances of its embodiment in law in the Trade Act of 1974 (assisting 
manufacturing communities), the President’s Northwest Forest Plan 
(assisting timber communities), the Tobacco Transition Payment Program 
(assisting tobacco farmers), and the POWER Initiative (assisting coal 
communities), among other examples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Political obstacles notwithstanding, many in the United States agree 
that carbon emissions must be quickly and dramatically reduced in order to 
avoid further catastrophic effects of climate change. Whether the path to a 
decarbonized world is more winding or straightforward, the effects of a 
transition to a low-carbon society will fall unevenly on many communities, 
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which raises serious normative questions of justice.1  In response to this 
concern, many call for a “just transition” to a low-carbon future.2 While this 
phrase has gained significant traction,3 its meaning remains unclear.4 
“Just transition” has at least two primary usages. First, the phrase is 
used to mean that the transition to a low-carbon society should be fair to the 
most vulnerable populations.5 The current fossil fuel-based economy has 
been characterized by inequality and environmental injustice, or 
environmental hazards that are inequitably distributed. 6  The new, low-
carbon economy should not repeat or exacerbate these injustices; in fact, the 
transition is a new opportunity, indeed an obligation, to counteract them.7 
The second meaning of “just transition” calls for protecting workers and 
communities who depend on high-carbon industries from bearing an undue 
burden  of the costs of decarbonization.8 It proposes that the shift to a low-
carbon economy will affect certain livelihoods disproportionately, and that 
 
 1. Cf. Ann Eisenberg, Civil Society Versus Transnational Corporations in International Energy 
Development: Is International Law Keeping Up?, in CHINA AND GOOD GOVERNANCE OF MARKETS IN 
LIGHT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 27 (Paolo Davide Farah ed., Routledge Pub., forthcoming 2019) (on 
file with author) (arguing that civil liberties may be sacrificed in the name of clean-energy development 
projects). 
 2. While this Article refers to “low-carbon” policy goals, these goals are assumed to also 
contemplate other greenhouse gas emissions with similar effects relating to climate change. The 
discussion focuses on carbon both for the sake of succinctness and because of carbon’s prominence 
among the greenhouse gases as a driver of climate change. 
 3. See Ngram Viewer: Just Transition, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com/ngrams 
/graph?content=just+transition&year_start=1800&year_end=2017&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=
&direct_url=t1%3B%2Cjust%20transition%3B%2Cc0 (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (searching for the 
frequency of the use of the term “just transition”). 
 4. Cf. Dimitris Stevis & Romain Felli, Green Transitions, Just Transitions? Broadening and 
Deepening Justice, 3 KURSWECHSEL 35, 35 (2016) (Ger.) (“In short, there are varieties of Just Transition, 
reflecting the politics of its various advocates.”). 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
 6. See Peter Newell & Dustin Mulvaney, The Political Economy of the ‘Just Transition’, 179 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 132, 132–33 (2013) (discussing inequality and fossil fuel usage). 
 7. See MARK SWILLING & EVE ANNECKE, JUST TRANSITIONS: EXPLORATIONS OF 
SUSTAINABILITY IN AN UNFAIR WORLD, 50–52 (2012); Victor B. Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without 
the Other: The Challenge of Integrating U.S. Environment, Energy, Climate, and Economic Policy, 44 
ENVTL. L. 1079, 1085 (2014) (discussing financial harms climate change has already posed to world 
economies and vulnerable populations). As an example, some scholarship has raised concerns about 
increased reliance on biofuels as a renewable energy source because of their potential to harm vulnerable 
populations—which would illustrate an unjust transition to renewables according to this definition. See, 
e.g., Nadia B. Ahmad, Blood Biofuels, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y FORUM 265, 282–94 (2017) 
(discussing impacts on small farmers and poor consumers in developing countries); Carmen G. Gonzalez, 
The Environmental Justice Implications of Biofuels, 20 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 229, 251–60 
(2016) (discussing impacts on taxpayers, small farmers, and poor consumers in developing countries); 
Uma Outka, Environmental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental Justice in the 
Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 77–85 (2012) (discussing impacts 
on Native American tribes and African American communities). 
 8. See infra Section I.A. 
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this impact should be mitigated.9 As one labor advocate explains, a just 
transition “means tackling climate change in a way that respects workers.”10 
This Article demonstrates that the latter, labor-driven concept of a just 
transition is not only justified but is key to overcoming many of the obstacles 
that plague climate reform. Environmental policy remains thwarted by a 
variety of problems old and new. Longstanding “jobs-versus environment” 
tensions persist, as well as the more general notion that environmental 
protection represents a zero-sum game with winners and losers. 11  Even 
before the current presidential administration, scholarship contemplated the 
future of environmental law in an era of legislative stagnation.12 Many have 
called for environmental law to adapt to the times by reshaping itself in 
various ways—letting go of some of its traditional emphases,13 crossing over 
into other doctrinal areas,14 and becoming more malleable in one manner or 
another in order to better interact with the political, economic, and social 
realities of a complex world.15 
 
 9. See David Doorey, Just Transitions Law: Putting Labour Law to Work on Climate Change, 30 
J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 201, 206–07 (2017). In light of climate change,  
energy and resource-intensive sectors are likely to stagnate or contract . . . new pressures will 
be brought to bear on unemployment, adjustment, and training strategies . . . . There will be 
winners and losers in domestic and international labour markets . . . . The idea of “just 
transition” to a greener, lower carbon economy has its roots in the global labour movement . . . . 
Just transition refers to a policy platform that advocates legal and policy responses and planning 
that recognizes the needs for economies to transition to lower carbon economic activity, while 
at the same time respects the need to promote decent work and a fair distribution of the risks 
and rewards associated with this transition. 
Id.; Newell & Mulvaney, supra note 6, at 133–34. 
 10. Josua Mata, What is ‘Just Transition’?, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Sept. 2016, at 21. 
 11. See Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328, 
10330–32, 10340–43 (2017).  
 12. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and Frontiers, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 
511, 511–12 (2015) (“Environmental law is currently—and has been for some time—in a phase that is 
simultaneously reassuring and worrisome. As a society, we have been generally well served by the forty-
five years of modern federal environmental law since 1970. . . . The unfortunate flip side of stability, at 
least in this case, has been a marked degree of ossification.”); David W. Case, The Lost Generation: 
Environmental Regulatory Reform in the Era of Congressional Abdication, 25 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
FORUM 49, 89 (2014) (“[T]he prospects that Congress will enact any such positive reform-minded 
environmental legislation in the foreseeable future appear nonexistent.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change 
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 407 (2010). But 
see Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) (arguing 
that environmental protections have expanded and become more sophisticated and that overly pessimistic 
narratives discount environmental law’s accomplishments).  
 13. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1281–91 
(2014) (calling for rethinking of environmental law as dominated and characterized by canon of major 
federal statutes enacted in 1970s, and proposing approaches that could work in antagonistic political 
climate, integrate with non-environmental laws, and better approach climate change); Todd S. Aagaard, 
Using Non-Environmental Law to Accomplish Environmental Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 
35, 35 (2014); Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century Environmental Regulation 
to 21st Century Sustainability, 47 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (2017). 
 14. See Aagaard, Environmental Law’s Heartland and Frontiers, supra note 12, at 512–13. 
 15. See Blake Hudson, Relative Administrability, Conservatives, and Environmental Regulatory 
  
2019] JUST TRANSITIONS 277 
The labor-driven concept of a just transition is powerfully poised to 
address these deep concerns if scholars and policymakers embrace it. First 
and most clearly, it reroutes jobs-versus-environment tensions into a 
principle of “jobs and environment,” taking one of the longstanding thorns 
in environmentalism’s side and marshaling it toward productive pathways.16 
Second, by blurring the boundaries between environmental law and labor 
law, it can help align environmental decisionmaking more with the realities 
of complex social-ecological systems.17 Third, by aligning environmental 
interests with labor concerns, it creates potential for coalition-building, thus 
informing both the ends of climate policy and the ever-elusive means for 
achieving it.18 Finally, in an age of dramatic populist alienation,19 it would 
inject much-needed economic equity considerations into environmental 
decisionmaking. 
 
Reform, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1661, 1661 (2016) (arguing that geographic-delineation policies at state and 
local level offers environmental reform plan that would be palatable to conservatives); Dave Owen, 
Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 224–25 
(2013) (arguing for applying quantitative spatial analysis to environmental law); Jedediah Purdy, 
American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 169 
(2012) (“Legal scholarship is in a bad position to make sense of [climate change] because the field has 
concentrated on making sound policy recommendations to an idealized lawmaker, neglecting the deeply 
held and sharply clashing values that drive, or block, environmental lawmaking.”); Rachael E. Salcido, 
Rationing Environmental Law in a Time of Climate Change, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 621 (2015) 
(arguing that “rationing” environmental law, in other words, selectively applying environmental law to 
renewable energy because of climate change, is not ideal, but is nonetheless worthwhile “based on the 
reality of political failures, market forces, and horrifying consequences of unchecked fossil fuel 
dependence”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law: The Role 
of Private Climate Governance, 32 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 382, 383 (2015) (arguing for “opportunity to 
buy time with private governance”). 
 16. Cf. Doorey, supra note 9, at 206–07. 
 17. Cf. Ruhl, supra note 12, at 407. 
 18. Cf. Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 82–
83 (1986) (criticizing environmentalism as separating ends of environmental policy from means 
necessary to attain the ends). So-called “blue-green alliances”—instances of environmental groups and 
labor groups joining forces to advocate for joint environmental and work-related platforms—demonstrate 
the potency of measures that bridge the historical rift between labor and environmental concerns. Ann M. 
Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems, 47 ENVTL. L. 127, 145 (2017). 
Notable examples exist of environmentalists acknowledging labor issues, and vice versa. In 1973, Sierra 
Club President Mike McCloskey called for “the government ‘to indemnify workers who are displaced in 
true cases of plant closures for environmental reasons.’” He argued, “[w]orkers should not be made to 
bear the brunt of any nation’s commitment to a decent environment for all. Society should assume this 
burden and aid them in every way possible.” LES LEOPOLD, THE MAN WHO HATED WORK AND LOVED 
LABOR 309 (2007). Today, the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations have partnered with 
large labor unions in a “blue-green alliance” to advocate for environmental reform alongside policies that 
“create and maintain quality jobs.” Members, BLUE GREEN ALLIANCE, 
https://www.bluegreenalliance.org/about/members (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
 19. Cf. Scott D. Campbell, Sustainable Development and Social Justice: Conflicting Urgencies 
and the Search for Common Ground in Urban and Regional Planning, 1 MICH. J. OF SUSTAINABILITY 
75, 75 (2013) (noting that “middle-class environmental interests typically trump the interests of the poor 
and marginalized, too often leading to an exclusionary sustainability of privilege rather than a 
sustainability of inclusion”); Eisenberg, supra note 18, at 127. 
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The Article also demonstrates that it is worth choosing one meaning for 
this term and that the labor-driven meaning makes more sense than the 
alternative. “Just transition” is a term of art that evolved in the labor 
movement, first known as a “superfund for workers.”20 Its specificity gives 
it potency, and it has already gained traction in other disciplines and with 
major international organizations.21  The broader usage, while important, 
seems redundant alongside comparable but better-known concepts, such as 
climate justice and energy justice.22 It is confusing and less productive for 
different disciplines, and different scholars within law, to use the same term 
with different understandings of its meaning.23 
I therefore argue that in the context of climate change, the just transition 
concept should be defined as some form of help for fossil fuel workers. Yet 
the broadest theoretical impetus for this help goes beyond environmental 
law. The just transition is an equitable principle of easing the burden that 
publicly-driven displacement poses to workers and communities who are 
highly dependent on a particular industry, especially a hazardous one. The 
theory has flavors of an estoppel concept, an unclean hands argument, or 
something akin to a call for takings compensation.24  It is a principle of 
distributive economic justice, insisting that those displaced should not alone 
sustain their economic losses. This idea arises most frequently in response to 
environmental progress, but it bears relevance to other contexts as well.25 
 
 20. LEOPOLD, supra note 18, at 417. 
 21. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
 22. See Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right 
Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 199 (2010) (“Climate justice embraces a human rights 
approach to advocating for rights and remedies for climate change . . . climate justice focuses on the rights 
of those disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change.”); Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican 
Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy Justice in Indigenous Communities, 56 NAT. RESOURCES 
J. 369, 379 (2016) (though not yet a cohesive field of study, energy justice provides overall framework 
to view related areas of climate justice, environmental justice, and energy democracy); see also Flatt & 
Payne, supra note 7, at 1081 (noting that “[e]nergy poverty” recognizes inextricable linkage between 
energy and “economics of the human condition.”). 
 23. Cf. Geoff Evans & Liam Phelan, Transition to a Post-Carbon Society: Linking Environmental 
Justice and Just Transition Discourses, 99 ENERGY POL’Y 329, 333 (2016). 
 24. Both unclean hands and estoppel are longstanding doctrines of equity that attempt to inject 
principles of fair play into parties’ dealings with one another. The unclean hands doctrine prevents parties 
from profiting from their own wrongdoing, while the estoppel doctrine prevents parties from taking 
inconsistent positions. See T. Leigh Anenson & Gideon Mark, Inequitable Conduct in Retrospective: 
Understanding Unclean Hands in Patent Remedies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (2013). Of course, it 
is not contemplated that fossil fuel workers could raise such claims in court successfully. Rather, the ideas 
underlying calls for just transitions seem to invoke similar principles: society should not profit 
substantially from its hazardous industries only to abandon the workers in those industries, and nor should 
it encourage fossil fuel development only to abruptly take the opposite stance. For a discussion of a 
takings analogy, see infra Section II.B. 
 25. See discussion infra Section III.B for brief treatments of displacement resulting from taxi 
drivers competing with ride-sharing services and displacement resulting from gentrification. A 
forthcoming article, Distributive Justice and Rural America, further explores the just transitions concept 
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The prospect of a law of just transitions raises many questions, 
however, some of which labor law scholar David Doorey has begun to 
explore in a germinal article examining the desirability of a potential new 
field combining aspects of labor law, environmental law, and environmental 
justice.26 How would just transitions relate to other models of distributive 
justice, such as environmental justice, which maintains that the burdens of 
pollution should be less discriminatorily and more equitably distributed?27 
How would it relate to sustainable development, which aims to reconcile 
environmental and economic considerations?28 Would it merely create new 
employment opportunities when climate-related regulations affect a certain 
sector, or is it what one union president called it—“a really nice funeral”?29 
Must there be a causal link between regulatory initiatives and impacts on 
jobs, or does a just transition also concern industry contractions that stem 
from market forces?30 Can the two be meaningfully differentiated?31 
This Article attempts to answer these questions. Part I provides 
background necessary for understanding the just transitions concepts, 
disambiguates the two different usages of the term, and argues that legal 
scholarship should embrace the labor-driven definition. Part II explores three 
avenues that could serve as theoretical justifications for the labor-driven just 
transition principle in the context of climate change. Based on a theory of 
distributive environmental decisionmaking, the history of injustice in 
coalfield communities, and principles of political economy and interest-
group theory, the discussion concludes that the labor-driven just transition 
 
as a principle of distributive economic justice. See generally Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and 
Rural America (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 26. See generally Doorey, supra note 9. 
 27. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 829 (1993). 
 28. See Outka, supra note 7, at 62–63 (“[S]ustainable development . . . means more than ‘greener’ 
economic development. Instead, it captures the interrelationship between the environment, the economy, 
and human well-being in the effort to meet ‘the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’”). 
 29. Dylan Brown, Mining Union Faces ‘Life-and-Death’ Test, E&E NEWS (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052929. 
 30. See infra Section II.B; see also Naomi Seiler et al., Legal and Ethical Considerations in 
Government Compensation Plans: A Case Study of Smallpox Immunization, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 3, 
14 (2004) (noting that the question of whether government should compensate someone raises the 
question of whether government actor caused harm in question; noting, too, that government can act either 
way out of compassion rather than obligation, and that causation by a non-government actor also raises 
question of whether government failed to protect from harm). 
 31. Cf. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) 
(“Focusing more directly on law as a dynamic phenomenon, on the benefits and costs of transitions, and 
on other factors that may encourage or impede transitions might bring some coherence to [the] famously 
incoherent area of [takings] law.”); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 509, 534 (1986) (“[N]one of the distinctions they offer for treating government and market risks 
differently withstands scrutiny.”). 
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principle is indeed legitimate, consistent with relevant norms, and necessary 
in the face of climate change. Part III synthesizes major federal transitional 
policies of the past several decades and argues that an effective law and 
policy of just transitions, especially when targeting regional displacement, 
must do more to untangle and address the complex, intertwined factors that 
shape communities’ dependency relationships with particular industries. 
The stakes of this inquiry are high. Coal miners have become a symbol 
for broader national divisions, and commentators still strive to understand 
the “urban/rural divide” that made its way into the national consciousness 
via the 2016 presidential election. This analysis offers insights for the plight 
of coal miners and other rural communities, as well as certain workers’ 
relationship with environmentalism and climate policy. It also implicates a 
reconsideration of work, workplace safety, well-paying jobs, abrupt societal 
change, and private and public accountability for many workers’ abject 
vulnerability in a period that has been contemplated as a “new Lochner 
era.”32 Major social and economic changes will continue to come. Scholars 
and policymakers would be well-advised to contemplate more robust 
transitional policy and baseline protections in light of the despair and 
instability unmitigated transitions can yield. 
I.  WHAT IS A “JUST TRANSITION”? BACKGROUND AND 
RHETORIC 
A.  THE TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY AND THE 
TRANSITION’S POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES 
The term “just transition” tends to arise in two contexts. Some use the 
expression to refer to more general principles of equity in the transition to a 
low-carbon economy.33 In other words, the shift to a low-carbon economy is 
an opportunity to rectify the injustices of the fossil fuel economy, and to not 
do so, or to allow inequalities to worsen, would itself effectuate injustice. On 
the other hand, some use the expression to refer to the nexus of labor and 
environmental reform, or the approach of taking work and jobs into account 
in or after environmental decisionmaking.34 Yet both meanings derive from 
overlapping circumstances. 
 
 32. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, A New Lochner Era, SLATE (June 29, 2018), https://slate.com 
/news-and-politics/2018/06/the-lochner-era-is-set-for-a-comeback-at-the-supreme-court.html. 
 33. SWILLING & ANNECKE, supra note 7; Caroline Farrell, A Just Transition: Lessons Learned 
from the Environmental Justice Movement, 45 DUKE F.L. & SOC. CHANGE 45, 45 (2012) (“As we 
transition away from a fossil fuel economy, we should . . . plan the transition not only to change the way 
we use fuel, but to create a truly just economy.”). 
 34. Doorey, supra note 9, at 7. 
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First, the fossil fuel-based economy characterizing the past century has 
had many casualties.35 They run the full gamut from a child developing 
asthma in rural Australia, 36  to executions of community advocates in 
Nigeria,37 to fishermen’s damaged livelihoods in the U.S. Gulf,38 to victims 
of geopolitical machinations, including war.39 People of color, indigenous 
communities, and people living in poverty have borne the worst burdens of 
the fossil fuel economy, in large part because of energy production.40 The 
ultimate “externality” is, of course, climate change, the impacts of which we 
are already beginning to feel.41 
The global community is currently experiencing substantial momentum 
toward a low-carbon, “clean energy” economy.42 This transition is driven in 
part by a prevalent desire to mitigate climate change, both in the United 
States and elsewhere.43  While the U.S. federal government is hostile to 
environmental regulation,44 many U.S. states, cities, and institutions have 
confirmed their ongoing commitment to reducing carbon emissions.45 For 
 
 35. See, e.g., Outka, supra note 7, at 68 (listing harmful health and environmental effects of fossil 
fuel production and consumption). 
 36. Cf. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23. 
 37. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 
941 (2001); see also Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from Environmental 
Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 792 (2017) (explaining that the U.S. petroleum industry has caused 
devastating human rights abuses in Africa and South America). 
 38. Debbie Elliot, 5 Years After BP Oil Spill, Effects Linger and Recovery Is Slow, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/20/400374744/5-years-after-bp-oil-spill-effects-
linger-and-recovery-is-slow. 
 39. E.g., Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC from Myth to Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433, 494 (2008). 
 40. Shannon Elizabeth Bell & Richard York, Community Economic Identity: The Coal Industry 
and Ideology Construction in West Virginia, 75 RURAL SOC. 111, 139 (2010); Jeanne Marie Zokovitch 
Paben, Green Power & Environmental Justice—Does Green Discriminate?, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1067, 
1108 (2014). 
 41. See Outka, supra note 7, at 790 (explaining that the energy sector’s reliance on fossil fuels, 
primarily coal, makes it the primary source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, a country 
which has contributed more to climate change than any other country); Salcido, supra note 15, at 618–19 
(listing effects of climate change already occurring, such as more severe, frequent storms). 
 42. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 330 (describing social movement for “post-carbon society,” 
which ranges from grassroots, “bottom-up surveillance” and demands for more democratic and 
decentralized energy sources, to major U.S. banks that have moved away from ever-riskier coal 
investments). 
 43. See, e.g., Tom Murray, China Is Going All in on Clean Energy as the U.S. Waffles. How Is that 
Making America Great Again?, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/edfenergyexchange/2017/01/06/china-is-going-all-in-on-clean-energy-as-the-u-s-waffles-how-is-that-
making-america-great-again/2/#769f3bac340f. 
 44. Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump Is Changing the 
Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 19, 2018), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017 
/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment. 
 45. Devashree Saha & Mark Muro, Growth, Carbon, and Trump: State Progress and Drift on 
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instance, “[d]ays after President Trump announced that he would be pulling 
the U.S. out of a global agreement to fight climate change, more than 1,200 
business leaders, mayors, governors and college presidents . . . signaled their 
personal commitment to the goal of reducing emissions.”46 The transition is 
also driven by market forces and concomitant evolutions in policy forces—
with “widespread recognition, including among utilities, that low-carbon 
policy drivers are here to stay.”47 Internationally, countries have taken the 
opposite approach to the Trump administration’s, such as with China’s plan 
to invest $360 billion in renewable energy by 2020. 48  Altogether, these 
factors have compelled some commentators to deem the transition to a low-
carbon society “inevitable.”49 
Nevertheless, a world with low carbon emissions does not somehow 
transform into a utopia. A shift to a clean-energy economy stands to 
perpetuate or exacerbate current patterns of inequity. Those patterns could 
specifically relate to low-carbon industries, for instance, through land theft 
to develop wind and solar farms, forced labor to extract the natural resources 
necessary to create solar panels, or impositions of health hazards from 
biomass fuels.50 The patterns could also arise in other contexts in the low-
carbon world, such us through inequitable access to clean energy.51 
While these novel risks have begun to receive more attention in 
dialogues on climate change and the clean-energy transition, so, too, has the 
slightly more controversial question of “jobs.” “Jobs versus environment” 
tensions surround nearly every environmental policy debate. 52  Industry 
advocates and workers argue frequently that environmental reform will 
destroy individual livelihoods and communities’ entire way of life.53 
 
 46. Camila Domonoske, Mayors, Companies Vow to Act on Climate, Even as U.S. Leaves Paris 
Accord, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/05 
/531603731/mayors-companies-vow-to-act-on-climate-even-as-u-s-leaves-paris-accord. 
 47. Outka, supra note 7, at 793; Murray, supra note 43. 
 48. Nigel Topping, The Irreversible Rise of the Clean Economy in 2017, GREENBIZ (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/irreversible-rise-clean-economy-2017. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Outka, supra note 7, at 77–85; Stevis & Felli, supra note 4, at 43 (“Like the grey economy 
before it, this Green Transition can be as exploitative of people and nature as the grey economy was, if 
there is no countervailing power and vision.”). 
 51. Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and Sustainable Development, 21 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 271 (2010). 
 52. Alex Geisinger, Uncovering the Myth of a Jobs/Nature Trade-Off, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 115 
passim (2001); Carey Catherine Whitehead, Wielding a Finely Crafted Legal Scalpel: Why Courts Did 
Not Cause the Decline of the Pacific Northwest Timber Industry, 38 ENVTL. L. 979, 981 (2008) 
(describing the “classic” jobs-versus-environment “story”). 
 53. See, e.g., Garrett Ballengee & Michael Reed, Clean Power Plan: All Pain, No Gain for West 
Virginia, THE HILL (Aug. 3, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/289694-
clean-power-plan-all-pain-no-gain-for-west-virginia. 
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Environmental groups—who have good reason to be cynical—have 
historically responded to these claims with dismissiveness.54 Environmental 
advocates have argued that concerns about jobs are either industry 
propaganda or misinformed in some way.55 Complaints that environmental 
reforms undermine jobs thus often encounter arguments that job losses are 
not as bad as claimed, or even if they are, environmental reform provides a 
net benefit to all that outweighs the cost of a few lost jobs.56 
This tension raises the question: do environmental regulations cause 
people to lose their jobs—with “lost jobs” often used as a rhetorical stand-in 
for lost good jobs?57 And if they do, does the benefit to the greater good 
offset the lost jobs? These questions are more complicated than they may 
seem. A first, critical point is that the changes that are necessary for the 
United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions adequately are 
dramatic. 58  Thus, climate reform that is meaningfully suited to climate 
change is not the same as the incremental environmental reforms of the past. 
According to one interpretation, carbon emissions in the United States need 
to decline by 40% over the next twenty years. 59  Methane and other 
greenhouse gas emissions also need to be reduced at some level.60  “To 
accomplish this goal will require across-the-board cuts in both production 
and consumption in all domestic fossil fuel sectors”61 and likely, in other 
industries as well.62 
 
 54. See, e.g., Geisinger, supra note 52. 
 55. E.g., id. See generally Lois J. Schiffer & Jeremy D. Heep, Forests, Wetlands and the 
Superfund: Three Examples of Environmental Protection Promoting Jobs, 22 J. CORP. L. 571 (1997) 
(describing as a “myth” that conflict exists between protection of environment and protection of jobs). 
 56. See, e.g., ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOHN IRONS, ECON. POLICY INST., BRIEFING PAPER #305  
REGULATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ECONOMY: FEARS OF JOB LOSS ARE OVERBLOWN 12 (2011) 
(“Regulations can have broad economic benefits that may not be apparent at first blush. Clean air 
regulations, for instance, significantly improve the health of workers and children, resulting in lower 
health care costs and more productive workers.”); Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation 
on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 174 (1999) (noting benefits to communities of shifts away from 
extractive industries); Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55. 
 57. Cf. Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America’s Eroding 
Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1763 (1993) (noting that plant closures of 1980s and 90s were “both 
quantitatively and qualitatively different” than regular layoffs and socioeconomic transitions in the 
number, size, and frequency of closings, as well as “disturbing patterns in the types of jobs lost and the 
types of jobs gained”). 
 58. See Robert Pollin & Brian Callaci, A Just Transition for U.S. Fossil Fuel Industry Workers, 27 
AM. PROSPECT 88, 89 (2016). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Maanvi Singh, Gassy Cows Are Warming the Planet and They’re Here To Stay, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO: THE SALT (Apr. 12, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/04/11/301794415/gassy-
cows-are-warming-the-planet-and-theyre-here-to-stay (methane from livestock accounted for 39% of 
agricultural greenhouse gas emissions in 2011). 
 61. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 89. 
 62. See generally, e.g., INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2010: AVIATION 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2010) (reporting that aviation accounts for around 2% of total CO2 emissions); 
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The “transition” is therefore a new era, which could involve a relatively 
rapid restructuring of society. This rapid restructuring could involve quicker, 
more extreme contractions of certain industries. According to economists 
Robert Pollin and Brian Callaci, in this scenario, “workers and communities 
whose livelihoods depend on the fossil fuel industry will unavoidably lose 
out in the clean energy transition. Unless strong policies are advanced to 
support these workers, they will face layoffs, falling incomes, and declining 
public-sector budgets to support schools, health clinics, and public safety.”63 
Yet even if the transition to a clean-energy economy involves more 
incremental changes, it is worth contemplating whether the environmental 
movement has itself periodically had a misinformed stance on the question 
of work. As many have pointed out, environmental regulations have been 
shown not to result in a net loss of jobs for a given society and may in fact 
produce net gains in employment.64 This may seem to support the “greater 
good” argument. Indeed, the clean-energy transition is anticipated to yield 
dramatic growth in the ever-burgeoning green energy sector, creating 
millions of new jobs over the course of the coming decades.65 
However, regulations and other measures have at times also been shown 
to catalyze job losses for discrete regions and sectors.66 Viewed through a 
legal geographies lens—which holds that questions of scale, scope, and place 
may show that what is “just” at one level is “unjust” at another67—this 
collateral damage of environmental reform does seem more problematic. As 
one commentator articulated, “[i]f you’re a coal miner in West Virginia, it’s 
 
LISA J. HANLE ET AL., CO2 EMISSIONS PROFILE OF THE U.S. CEMENT INDUSTRY (2004) (noting that 
cement production is a substantial CO2 emitter); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,  FAST FACT: U.S. 
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 1990–2015, at 1 (2017) (noting that 
transportation accounted for 27% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions in 2015). 
 63. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 89.  
 64. Geisinger, supra note 52. 
 65. Pollin & Callaci, supra note 58, at 88. 
 66. Doorey, supra note 9, at 221 (“[N]ew regulations limiting emissions or requiring ‘green’ 
production equipment or techniques can affect production systems in ways that impact working 
conditions, cause layoffs, or create downward pressure on labour costs.”); Alana Semuels, Do 
Regulations Really Kill Jobs?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business 
/archive/2017/01/regulations-jobs/513563 (“Regulations that seek to make air and water cleaner can also 
cause concentrated job losses in certain industries and locations.”); see also Lands Council v. McNair, 
494 F.3d 771, 779 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that an injunction of timber harvest would force timber 
companies to lay off some or all of their workers); Schiffer & Heep, supra note 55, at 582. 
No economic analysis can ignore the suffering of some rural communities, which bear the brunt 
of the economic pain associated with reduced federally subsidized timber supplies. In addition 
to lost jobs and the associated closure of local businesses, county governments are receiving 
lower U.S. Treasury payments resulting from timber sales at the same time the county’s social 
services are most in demand. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 67. Cf. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from Property and 
Criminal Law, 53 VILL. L. REV. 117, 122 (2008). 
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not a great comfort that a bunch of guys in Texas are employed doing natural 
gas.”68 While industry advocates undoubtedly exploit, or sometimes invent, 
such harms, it is possible that the environmental movement has also turned 
a blind eye to them. 
Do job losses that are not clearly the proximate cause of legal reform, 
but that stem from the evolution of market forces, also deserve attention? 
Society did not, after all, provide special support to the employees of 
Blockbuster when mail-order DVDs and online streaming took their place 
because those services were more convenient and in demand. Why should 
workers who lose in the transition to a low-carbon economy be given 
preferential treatment over the many other workers who lose in diverse, 
market-driven scenarios, if policymakers are not intentionally causing them 
to lose for the greater good?  
The question of causation is addressed in more depth in the subsequent 
discussion, in which I argue that, especially in the energy sector, it is very 
difficult to disentangle causal forces among law, policy, and market 
operations. But further, workers’ dependency relationship with a particular 
industry and lack of alternative options may be what trigger the need for a 
just transition; in other words, equitable factors may drive this theory just as 
much, if not more, than causal ones. Yet, again, these tensions also raise the 
question of a possible choice between more robust transitional policies and 
more robust protections for workers and communities in general. 
B.  DEFINING A “JUST TRANSITION” 
The idea of a just transition originated with the labor movement in the 
late twentieth century, in part in response to the environmental movement.69 
Labor and environmental activist Tony Mazzocchi is credited with coining 
the term, with the original version called a “Superfund for Workers.”70 
Referencing the superfund—a federally-financed program to clean up toxic 
wastes in the environment—suggested Mazzocchi’s proposal was an 
analogous remedial measure, but for human beings. It was based on the idea 
that workers who had been exposed to toxic chemicals throughout their 
careers should be entitled to minimum incomes and education benefits to 
 
 68. Jia Lynn Yang, Does Government Regulation Really Kill Jobs? Economists Say Overall Effect: 
Minimal., WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy 
/does-government-regulation-really-kill-jobs-economists-say-overall-effect-minimal/2011/10/19 
/gIQALRF5IN_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f23e96256dfa. 
 69. Doorey, supra note 9, at 203; Newell & Mulvaney, supra note 6; Evans & Phelan, supra note 
23, at 333; Stevis & Felli, supra note 4, at 35. 
 70. LEOPOLD, supra note 18, at 417. 
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transition away from their hazardous jobs.71 Mazzocchi believed “that both 
nuclear workers and toxic workers, ‘because of the danger of their jobs and 
their service to the country, should be entitled to full income and benefits for 
life even if their jobs are eliminated,’” although he later gave in to pressure 
to reduce his demand to four years of support.72 After environmentalists 
complained that the word “superfund” “had too many negative 
connotations,” the proposal’s name was changed to “[j]ust [t]ransition.”73 
In the 1970s and through his death in the early 2000s, Mazzocchi and 
his associates were involved in creating “powerful labor-environmental 
alliances” that pursued the just transition campaign with the hope of 
addressing “the jobs-versus-environment conundrum.”74 He was “the first 
union president to negotiate partnerships with Greenpeace and the 
environmental justice communities.” 75  He also developed educational 
programs for workers on the environment.76  Mazzocchi’s advocacy thus 
forms the basis of the modern iteration of the labor-driven “just transition” 
concept. This foundation shapes the term’s modern usage as the idea that 
workers and communities whose livelihoods will be lost because of an 
intentional shift away from hazardous activity deserve some sort of support 
through public policy.77 
Meanwhile, the broader usage of “just transition” is of less certain 
origin. It appears to be the plain-language interpretation of the labor 
movement’s term of art, thereby calling for “justice” more generally, and not 
just for workers. In other words, it emphasizes the importance of not 
continuing to sacrifice the well-being of vulnerable groups for the sake of 
advantaging others, as has been the norm in the fossil-fuel-driven economy. 
Thus, the broad concept of a “just transition” may in fact be even more 
radical than the narrow one because the former calls for a grand restructuring 
of societal inequality. 
This discussion focuses on the labor-driven usage of just transitions and 
argues that legal scholars should do the same for two main reasons, beyond 
the fact that it is confusing for scholars in different spheres to be using the 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 416. 
 73. Id. at 417. 
 74. Id. at 468. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. But see Caleb Goods, A Just Transition to a Green Economy: Evaluating the Response of 
Australian Unions, 39 AUSTL. BULL. OF LAB. 13, 15 (2013) (“A just transition clearly seeks to resolve 
the divisive jobs versus environment problem; however, actual union commitments to what a just 
transition response constitutes can be assessed as variable and unclear.”). 
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same emergent term with different meanings, and in addition to the 
theoretical discussion below. First, the labor-related usage seems to predate 
the broad usage and to have gained more traction. Major international 
organizations have embraced the labor-related meaning. Just transitions for 
workers have been adopted as goals by the United Nations Environment 
Program, the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), and the World 
Health Organization.78 In 2013, the ILO published a policy framework for a 
just transition, which focused specifically on workers, noting that 
“[s]ustainable development is only possible with the active engagement of 
the world of work.”79 
In addition, the labor-related usage’s specificity makes it stand out. The 
broad call for justice shares similarities with other models used to call for 
equity in the face of climate change, including environmental justice, climate 
justice, and energy justice.80 This overlap may suggest that the broad concept 
has less of a niche to fill than the narrow one, and more risk of redundancy. 
By contrast, the labor usage’s narrowness may give it more potency.81 In 
other words, it is not clear what a broad call for a just transition adds to these 
powerful and better-known concepts of justice, which all relate directly to 
the low-carbon shift. 
Scholarly commentary complicates the choice somewhat because the 
literature seems split between the two usages. The broad meaning appears in 
at least some social science and legal scholarship. In a 2012 book entitled 
Just Transitions, two sustainability scholars defined a just transition as one 
“that addresses the widening inequalities between the approximately one 
billion people who live on or below the poverty line and the billion or so who 
are responsible for over 80 percent of consumption expenditure.” 82 
Environmental justice scholar Caroline Farrell has characterized a just 
transition as one that avoids “the problems with the fossil fuel 
 
 78. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333. 
 79. INT’L LABOUR ORG., GUIDELINES FOR A JUST TRANSITION TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES FOR ALL 3–4, 13 (2015) (advising governments to include 
implementing workers’ skills training and engaging workers and their representatives in the means to 
achieve low-carbon policies while creating and protecting employment). 
 80. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45 (discussing environmental justice); Shelley Welton, Clean 
Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 573 (2017) (discussing “clean energy justice,” or the idea that 
“the suite of policies boosting green jobs also creates a new genre of environmental justice challenges,” 
and other inequitable effects of clean energy policies); see Ruhl, supra note 13, at 407 (noting “climate 
justice” refers to the fact that climate change impacts will be felt unevenly throughout the world; the 
capacity to adapt to climate change is also unevenly distributed). 
 81. See infra Section III.C; cf. Frederico Cheever & John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development 
and Its Discontents, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 247, 282 (2015) (rejecting criticisms of “sustainable 
development” as too vague to be useful). 
 82. SWILLING & ANNECKE, supra note 7, at xiii. 
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economy . . . [and aims] to create a truly just economy,” or as a “transition 
to an economy that does not create disparate environmental impacts.”83 
Sociologists, political scientists, and several legal scholars who have 
explored the labor-related meaning provide a solid foundation from which to 
continue examining it.84 They have also begun filling in the contours of 
what, exactly, this usage of “just transitions” means. Rural sociologist Linda 
Lobao interprets a just transition as one that “mov[es coal] communities 
toward economic sectors that offer a better future.” 85  Interdisciplinary 
scholars Evans and Phelan define it more broadly as “a political campaign to 
‘ensure that the costs of environmental change [towards sustainability] will 
be shared fairly. Failure to create a just transition means that the cost of 
moves to sustainability will devolve wholly onto workers in targeted 
industries and their communities.’”86 
In the legal sphere, David Doorey’s definition emphasizes work 
somewhat more. He explains the concept as “a policy platform that advocates 
legal and policy responses and planning that recognizes the need for 
economies to transition to lower carbon economic activity, while at the same 
time respects the need to promote decent work and a fair distribution of the 
risks and rewards associated with this transition.”87 Climate law scholar J. 
Mijin Cha describes a just transition as “protecting workers who are 
impacted by climate protection policy,” including by re-training workers and 
providing them with education funds.88 Ramo and Behles emphasize the 
need to recognize communities’ economic dependency on high-emissions 
activity as those communities transition away from that activity, suggesting, 
like Labao, that a just transition “help[s] revitalize . . . fossil-fuel dependent 
communities.”89 
Calls for just transitions appear to arise the most in union advocacy, 
which again lends weight to the choice of the labor-driven definition. The 
 
 83. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45, 49. 
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States in a New Economic Era, 81 RURAL SOC. 343, 343 (2016); Judson Abraham, Just Transitions for 
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 85. Lobao et al., supra note 84, at 377. 
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 87. Doorey, supra note 9, at 207. 
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International Trade Union Confederation has described a just transition as a 
“tool the trade union movement shares with the international community, 
aimed at smoothing the shift towards a more sustainable society and 
providing hope for the capacity of a ‘green economy’ to sustain decent jobs 
and livelihoods for all.”90 Generally, just transitions advocates “highlight the 
need to engage affected workers and their representative trade unions in 
institutionalised formal consultations with relevant stakeholders including 
governments, employers and communities at national, regional and sectoral 
levels.”91 
Despite the appearance of “justice” in the name of just transitions, few 
legal commentators have delved more deeply into the legitimacy, 
significance, or traits of the idea of a just transition. The next Part reviews 
Doorey’s article, further characterizes the labor-driven just transition 
concept, and explores what principles may or may not support the concept. 
II.  CAN A LAW OF JUST TRANSITIONS BE JUSTIFIED? 
This Part asks whether incorporating the just transition principle into 
law is a worthwhile endeavor, theoretically and practically. Exploring three 
potential justifications for doing so—one based on environmental theory, 
one based on the experiences of coal communities, and one based on 
strategic considerations—the discussion reveals that pursuing just transitions 
is not merely a nice thing to do. Rather, this discussion supports the 
conclusion that the concept not only fits neatly within the sustainable 
development framework—an internationally accepted framework for 
reconciling competing interests in environmental decisionmaking—but that 
it in fact injects a long-overlooked, much-needed consideration of economic 
equity.92  This Part argues further that coal communities are particularly 
worthy of attention because of their history of combined exploitation and 
dependence. This Part’s third argument relies on interest-group theory to 
propose that the pursuit of just transitions is desirable because it could unite 
environmental and labor groups around the goal of a potentially more 
attainable and more equitable climate policy than prior efforts have secured. 
 
 90. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333. 
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David Doorey’s article is the first piece of legal scholarship to explore 
the worthiness and potential contours of a body of Just Transitions Law 
(“JTL”). He notes that labor law scholars have “mostly ignored” the effects 
that climate change will have on labor markets, while environmental law 
scholars have generally disregarded labor relationships.93 Because neither 
legal field seems adequately equipped to handle climate change, he considers 
whether a new field is needed that combines the strengths of each.94 
Doorey suggests that areas of common ground between labor and 
environmental scholarship might be ripe for doctrinal synthesis, such as the 
fact that both are in the business of “impos[ing] a countervailing power on 
unbridled economic activity.” 95  Yet he also notes that “jobs versus 
environment” tensions and other conflicting interests have tended to keep the 
fields apart.96 Without coming to a firm conclusion as to whether JTL is 
worthwhile as a new legal field, Doorey does conclude that a just transition 
strategy is critical in the face of climate change, and that “[t]o implement a 
just transition strategy, governments need to design policies that cross 
existing government ministerial portfolios and legal regimes.”97 
Doorey explores three potential forms for a body of law that marries 
aspects of labor and environment, including: 1) “[a] [l]aw of [e]conomic 
[s]ubordination and [r]esistance” that combines environmental justice’s and 
labor law’s overlapping recognition of power relations and embrace of 
collective, bottom-up resistance; 98  2) a law of “[h]uman [c]apital or 
[c]apacities,” which would assess the fairness of rules, both environmental 
and labor-related, based upon whether they further human capabilities and 
freedom; and 3) an explicitly-named body of “Just Transitions Law,” 
(“JTL”), which would draw upon existing just transitions policy strategies, 
such as the ILO’s, aimed at joint consideration of environmental and labor 
goals, including pursuing cross-sectoral collaboration, incentivizing 
sustainable industries, and offsetting impacts to workers affected by 
environmental policies.99 
For his third proposal, the explicit body of JTL, Doorey provides three 
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 96. Id. at 214. 
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“normative claims (NC) drawn from climate science, environmental law, 
environmental justice, and labour law.”100 They include: 
Firstly, climate change is a pressing global problem that market forces 
alone will not adequately address. Therefore, states should respond 
through public policy and law (NC1). Secondly, public policy should 
encourage a transition towards “greener”, lower carbon economies (NC2). 
Thirdly, there will be social and economic costs and benefits associated 
with climate change, and with the transitional policies aimed at responding 
to it, and those costs and benefits will also not be equitably distributed by 
market forces alone. Therefore, governments should seek to minimize the 
economic and social harms associated with the desired transition to a 
greener economy, and attempt, through law and policy, to distribute those 
harms and any resulting benefits in an equitable manner (NC3).101 
This discussion begins with Doorey’s third proposal and adopts his 
normative claims for reference. While his first two proposals have great 
appeal, his third one seems to capture the already-existing evolution of this 
area of law. 
However, like with the broadly-defined just transition described above, 
one might ask what this set of normative claims adds to the concept of 
climate justice. A centerpiece of the evolving theory of climate justice is 
public policy geared toward equitable sharing of the burdens and benefits of 
climate change through transparent consultation with diverse 
stakeholders.102 Climate justice also espouses recognition of the fact that 
some communities are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than 
others, and are more likely to be excluded from benefits.103 
In order to capture the potency that more specific concepts may yield, 
to avoid duplicative efforts, and to recognize the labor movement’s role in 
formulating this theory of justice, I would add a fourth normative claim to 
Doorey’s third proposal, whether explicitly or implicitly, which is justified 
in more depth below: the needs of the workers and communities that have 
developed dependency relationships with high-carbon industries, often with 
substantial past and present socioeconomic costs, should specifically factor 
into calculating the equitable distribution of harms and benefits in the 
transition to a decarbonized economy. This consideration is not proposed as 
a competitor to environmental justice, climate justice, or any other 
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framework concerned with vulnerability. It is, rather, a call for the specific 
recognition of work and existing economic dependencies in the 
decarbonization process, which have often gone overlooked. 
This discussion does not take up the question of whether JTL should be 
an entirely new area of law. Like Doorey’s, it is intended as an “early 
contribution” to this emerging field.104 The discussion therefore explores 
instead whether the just transition principle is worthwhile, and how it could 
be incorporated into law—which is perhaps also a worthwhile consideration 
as an alternative to establishing a new legal field. 
A.  AN ENVIRONMENTAL THEORY OF JUST TRANSITIONS 
The discussion in this Section argues that the labor-driven just transition 
concept has a natural and important place within current prominent 
distributive environmental decisionmaking frameworks. In other words, this 
discussion seeks to legitimize the concept and situate it in relevant literature. 
The discussion shows that the idea is neither foreign nor frivolous in relation 
to environmental theory. But further, I argue that it adds a point of 
consideration that other frameworks have tended to overlook, suggesting all 
the more that it is a worthwhile idea. 
The just transition concept, understood in the context of climate change, 
is a call for distributive justice in (or after) environmental decisionmaking.105 
In order to understand or define it, then, it is important to assess it in relation 
to existing models for environmental distributive justice. Sustainable 
development and environmental justice are two of the most prominent of 
these models.106  Each model strayed from traditional environmentalism, 
which is largely focused on pro-conservation, anti-pollution measures, in 
order to try to establish a framework that takes more socioeconomic realities 
into account, including the need for equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens.107 
Environmental injustice was originally known as environmental racism, 
calling attention to the fact that communities of color bear a disproportionate 
burden of environmental hazards.108 Sustainable development, meanwhile, 
is a forward-looking decisionmaking paradigm that seeks to harmonize 
conservation priorities with economic considerations as well as social 
 
 104. Doorey, supra note 9. 
 105. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 106. Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031 passim (2003). 
See generally Guruswamy, supra note 51. 
 107. Outka, supra note 7, at 64–65. 
 108. Id. 
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equity. 109  While environmental justice adds a civil rights component to 
environmentalism, sustainable development aims to mitigate standard 
development by incorporating historically overlooked priorities into 
development decisions.110 
The just transition concept exhibits a significant parallel with 
environmental justice in that both ideas were born as social movements in 
the late twentieth century in response to the environmental movement.111 
Environmental justice calls for racial equity (and other forms of non-
discrimination), while just transitions calls for labor equity. The movements 
are thus not dissimilar in that each advocates a distributive component on top 
of traditional environmentalism’s conservation priorities. Another parallel is 
that each is a broad, equitable principle that is at times embodied in laws in 
different ways. Yet the movements and legal schemes associated with each 
concept have rarely interacted, in part because of conflicting priorities and 
cultural backgrounds.112 
Sustainable development, as compared to environmental justice, has 
perhaps more direct applicability to the question of work. The sustainable 
development approach aims to “capture[] the interrelationship between the 
environment, the economy, and human well-being in the effort to meet ‘the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs.’” 113  In other words, it is “a decisionmaking 
framework to foster human well-being by ensuring that societies achieve 
development and environment goals at the same time.” 114  Sustainable 
development directly aims to undermine the fossil fuel economy. It thus, in 
turn, creates the need for a “just transition,” in that it is fundamentally 
premised on a shift to renewable energy sources.115 Yet it also may provide 
tools for ensuring a just transition because of its concern for economic and 
equity-related priorities. 
 
 109. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 51. 
 110. Outka, supra note 7, at 64. 
 111. Evans & Phelan, supra note 23, at 333. 
 112. Id. at 331. 
[W]hile there is potential synergy between environmental justice and just transitions 
campaigns, a harmonious resolution of the two concepts is not guaranteed if the interests and 
aspirations within the community are poorly negotiated between the parties involved. A 
melding of environmental justice campaign goals on the one hand and labour movement goals 
on the other, is particularly challenged by the continuing hegemony of the ‘jobs versus 
environment’ discourse. 
Id. 
 113. Outka, supra note 7, at 62–63. 
 114. John C. Dernbach, Creating Legal Pathways to a Zero Carbon Future, 46 ENVTL. LAW REP. 
10780, 10782 (2016). 
 115. Outka, supra note 7, at 72–74. 
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While sustainable development as a theory faces many criticisms, it is 
“not simply an academic or policy idea; it is the internationally accepted 
framework for maintaining and improving human quality of life.”116 For 
instance, based on the overall aim of sustainable development, international 
frameworks have adopted as goals both poverty eradication and addressing 
“[t]he deep fault line that divides human society between the rich and the 
poor and the ever-increasing gap between the developed and developing 
worlds . . . .”117 Sustainable development’s actual implementation takes on 
many forms, as the approach “needs to be realized in the particular economic, 
natural, and other settings of each specific country,”118  as well as each 
specific state or city. “The key action principle of sustainable development 
is integrated decisionmaking. Essentially, decisionmakers must consider and 
advance environmental protection at the same time as they consider and 
advance their economic and social development goals.”119 This contrasts 
with conventional development, where environmental concerns historically 
arose only as afterthoughts.120 
Sustainable development decisionmaking is often represented as a 
triangle. Its three points are the economy, the environment, and equity or 
social justice.121 The points are a simplified representation of the three values 
or priorities that sustainable development seeks to reconcile.122 The standard 
sustainable development triangle is represented in Figure 1. 
 
 116. Dernbach, supra note 114, at 10782 (footnote omitted); see also Campbell, supra note 19, at 
75. 
[D]espite the perhaps inevitable criticisms of immeasurability and vagueness, sustainability has 
endured as a central principle in urban planning because its oppositional engagement with social 
justice and economic development continually reinvigorates sustainability planning, keeps the 
term relevant and inclusive, and grants the task of urban planning greater urgency. 
Campbell, supra note 19, at 75. 
 117. Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Dev., U.N. Doc A/CONF.199/20, at 2 (2002). 
 118. Outka, supra note 7, at 64. 
 119. Dernbach, supra note 114, at 33 (footnotes omitted). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 19, at 83; Edward H. Ziegler, American Cities and Sustainable 
Development in the Age of Global Terrorism: Some Thoughts on Fortress America and the Potential for 
Defensive Dispersal II, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 110 (2005) (“[S]ocial equity, and 
particularly intergenerational equity, along with resource conservation and environmental protection, are 
central concepts in sustainable development philosophy.”). 
 122. These values are also referred to as “the three Es (Economy, Environment, and Equity)[.] 
[S]ustainable development is often defined as an endeavor that strives to maintain equilibrium between 
these domains.” Catherine L. Ross et al., Measuring Regional Transportation Sustainability: An 
Exploration, 43 URB. LAW. 67, 69 (2010). 
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FIGURE 1.  Sustainable Development Framework 
 
The triangle represents an accessible conceptualization of the harmony 
that the decisionmaking paradigm seeks to achieve. In turn, these three 
values are embodied in law and policy in varied ways. For example, a 
traditional building code, reworked through the lens of sustainable 
development values, could transform into a “green” building code, 
prioritizing materials with minimal environmental impacts and low-carbon 
energy sources. The “equity” prong might dictate that new housing 
developments, as an example, should not only be green, but also affordable. 
Environmental justice and sustainable development may seem like they 
occupy different spheres of environmental theory, but Uma Outka has 
observed that they have the potential for synergy. She notes a risk of conflict 
between the two models as the broader sustainable development agenda 
might prove insensitive to environmental justice concerns.123 For instance, 
at the project level, sustainable development and environmental justice can 
face tensions, such as if the siting of wind farms (comporting with 
sustainable development’s driving concern for carbon reduction) harms 
indigenous cultural resources (violating environmental justice’s concern for 
communities’ autonomous decisionmaking and the non-discrimination 
principle).124 Yet Outka argues that environmental justice in fact refines 
sustainable development by adding the particular environmental justice 
 
 123. Outka, supra note 7, at 66; see also Campbell, supra note 19, at 76 (“The sustainability and 
social justice movements may be coming closer together, yet much still divides them into two separate 
conversations that frequently overhear each other without easily merging.”). 
 124. Outka, supra note 7, at 85. 
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conception of equity.125 She concludes that for sustainable development to 
be consistent with environmental justice, the significant differences among 
renewable energy sources require more recognition and concrete definition, 
so that each pathway’s potential for inequity can be better understood and 
addressed.126 
 Outka’s articulation of this relationship can thus perhaps be represented 
by Figure 2 below, which highlights environmental justice as an aspect of 
the sustainable development framework at the nexus of the environment and 
equity points of the triangle. In other words, environmental justice becomes 
another value that must be harmonized with other values in environmental 
decisionmaking, including the three Es. As a principle of environmental 
equity, environmental justice aligns with sustainable development at the 
nexus of sustainable development’s environment and equity prongs.  
FIGURE 2.  Sustainable Development with Environmental Justice 
Refinement 
 
Figure 2 is not meant to suggest that environmental justice is the only 
refinement to sustainable development, or the only point of interest on the 
environment-equity leg. However, in a decisionmaking framework that is 
intended to manage complex scenarios, understanding these relationships 
can help inform the characteristics of normative paradigms. Environmental 
justice is a call for environmental equity, and it has a natural locus in the 
sustainable development paradigm. 
 
 125. Id. at 63; see also Campbell, supra note 19, at 77 (suggesting that environmental justice is an 
“important subset of the larger field of urban sustainability”). 
 126. Outka, supra note 7, at 91. 
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When viewed through the framework of sustainable development, just 
transitions no longer seems like such a foreign concept to environmental law. 
Primarily, environmental decisionmakers already have a framework for 
considering questions of economic equity as they relate to environmental 
decisionmaking. Just transitions, with its concern for avoiding or mitigating 
inequitable impacts to livelihoods in environmental decisions, is ultimately 
a doctrine of economic equity. Thus, a natural place for just transitions is 
running parallel to environmental justice and in the analogous position along 
the economic and equity side of the triangle, as shown in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3.  Sustainable Development Framework with Environmental 
Justice and Just Transitions 
 
This visualization is powerful because it suggests that, like 
environmental justice, a just transition is simply a refinement to a framework 
upon which decisionmakers already rely. While it might also be said to have 
already existed along the economy-equity side, it has largely gone 
unrecognized. Just as environmental justice is a principle of environmental 
equity that must be harmonized with other values, the just transition is a 
principle of economic equity that should also factor into the calculus—and 
it appears to have a natural place within that calculus. 
Another reason this visualization is powerful is that it builds upon 
increasingly vocal calls for environmental justice to inform the transition to 
a low-carbon society. 127  These calls, in fact, circle back on the broad 
meaning of the just transition—the idea that the decarbonization process 
 
 127. Id. at 122. 
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must be done fairly in general. 128  One may be concerned that these 
paradigms might all conflict with each other in the transition, or pose 
difficult zero-sum choices. The visualization in Figure 3 shows that these 
principles are complementary, and in fact, bring environmental 
decisionmaking toward a more holistic picture of societal needs.129 
This visualization may also help reconcile some of the tensions between 
sustainable development theory and resilience theory. Resilience theory has 
emerged as a counter-framework to sustainable development.130 Resilience 
theorists’ criticisms of sustainable development are that sustainable 
development assumes stationary, controllable circumstances; potentially 
sanctions current patterns of harmful development and an ethic of “green 
consumerism;” and fails to account for complexity, or the interrelatedness of 
complex social-ecological systems. 131  This latter point is particularly 
concerning to resilience theorists in the age of climate change, which will 
involve more drastic changes in ecological and social regimes than 
previously seen. 132  Resilience theorists instead advocate decisionmaking 
paradigms that are iterative, or ongoing, rather than traditional planning 
processes; that involve “principled flexibility;” 133  and that anticipate 
constant change in social-ecological systems.134 Adaptive management and 
adaptive governance have been considered potential vehicles for pursuing 
resilience governance, although scholars agree that a gap remains between 
theory and practice.135 
Although the rift may be large, perhaps the addition of environmental 
justice and just transitions to the sustainable development framework brings 
sustainable development a modest inch closer to resilience thinking. The 
more points of interest that are added to the sustainable development 
framework, the more sustainable development would seem to wield potential 
for decisionmaking that accommodates social-ecological systems. Figure 4 
illustrates that the framework above can in fact represent a continuum of 
 
 128. Farrell, supra note 33, at 45. 
 129. Cf. id. at 51. Farrell uses the broad just transitions meaning, but she also concludes that holistic 
decisionmaking is necessary going forward. 
 130. Eisenberg, Alienation and Reconciliation, supra note 18. 
 131. Melinda Harm Benson & Robin Kundis Craig, The End of Sustainability, 27 SOC’Y & NAT. 
RES. 777, 779–80 (2014). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for 
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 63–64 (2010). 
 134. Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); Flatt & Payne, supra note 7 at 1081. 
 135. Benson & Craig, supra note 131. 
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social, economic, and natural concerns.136 While there are infinite points of 
interest on the continuum, environmental justice and just transitions show 
points of particular concern based on society’s historical and potential 
inequities. If one recognizes that the sustainable development paradigm 
could have infinite points, the next natural inference must be an acceptance 
of uncertainty because infinite interacting aspects of social-ecological 
systems could never be stationary. 
FIGURE 4.  Making Sustainable Development Work for Social-Ecological 
Systems 
 
In any case, the frameworks above show how the just transition concept 
has a natural place with several prominent environmental theories of today. 
But it can also follow the path of environmental justice and sustainable 
development in that it may at times be a principle warranting contemplation, 
 
 136. The President’s Northwest Forest Plan, discussed below as an example of just transitions 
policy that aided communities hurt by the decline in the timber industry, lends weight to the potential of 
the just transitions concept to help bring sustainable development goals more in line with resilience 
theory, although the Plan itself is considered a mixed success. Susan Charnley, formerly of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, said of the Plan: 
From a social perspective, the Northwest Forest Plan as a model for broad-scale ecosystem 
management is perhaps most valuable in its attempt to link the biophysical and socioeconomic 
goals of forest management by creating high-quality jobs for residents of forest communities in 
restoration, research, monitoring, and other forest stewardship activities that protect the 
environment.  
Susan Charnley, The Northwest Forest Plan as a Model for Broad-Scale Ecosystem Management: A 
Social Perspective, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 330, 338 (2006). 
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rather than all or part of a framework in and of itself. Both environmental 
justice and sustainable development are “normative conceptual 
framework[s]” that are in turn embodied in law in various ways, sometimes 
simply as policy goals.137 Just transitions can join their ranks as such a 
principle as well, offering an additional equitable priority, or a more concrete 
framework for decisionmaking. 
In general, environmental law scholars have increasingly recognized 
the need to account for the jobs question, rather than to dismiss it.138 As 
Richard Lazarus articulates, “there has been at best only an ad hoc 
accounting of how the benefits of environmental protection are spread 
among groups of persons.”139  Environmental law scholars have recently 
contemplated how to overcome the perception and reality of “zero-sum” 
environmentalism, in which some segments of society must lose, or think 
they are losing, in pursuit of environmental progress.140 This realization has 
come about at the same time as the recognition that environmental law is 
overall inadequate in the face of climate change.141 The placement of just 
transitions into the framework above helps address both these concerns. It 
provides a way to think about contemplating livelihoods in environmental 
decisionmaking, as well as making decisionmaking align better with social-
ecological systems. 
B.  FOSSIL FUEL-DEPENDENT COMMUNITIES: AN EXEMPLARY CASE 
STUDY FOR JUST TRANSITIONS 
The discussion in this Section examines what, exactly, is meant by 
“fossil fuel-dependent communities” and why they have prompted so much 
interest in just transitions in the climate change era. Many communities that 
depend on high-carbon industries have a unique history and relationship to 
work, and many have borne profound costs associated with energy 
production for over a century. 142  Yet the rest of society has alternately 
encouraged, acquiesced in, or benefited from this hazardous, economically 
depleting way of life.143 Based on these troubling circumstances, this Section 
argues that the labor-driven just transition concept is legitimate because it is 
fair to these specific communities. A critical point is to understand that fossil 
fuel-dependent communities were not born in a vacuum. They were created. 
 
 137. See Cheever & Dernbach, supra note 81, at 251. 
 138. Flatt & Payne, supra note 7, at 1079. 
 139. Lazarus, supra note 27, at 787. 
 140. Baker et al., supra note 11. 
 141. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 134. 
 142. Bell & York, supra note 40. 
 143. Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 87 (2011). 
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This discussion uses Appalachia as an example, but its story is relevant to 
comparable scenarios throughout the country.144 
As early as the 1700s, companies played a central role in developing 
isolated Appalachian mono-economies, or monopsonies, where workers and 
communities became hostage to desperate dependency relationships.145 The 
dependence stemmed in part from a rush of speculators in the 1800s seeking 
to acquire Appalachian land.146 Locals, mostly subsistence farmers, did not 
know the worth of the minerals under their land and sold property interests 
for well under market value.147 “Others who refused to sell their land became 
victims of legal traps, such as being jailed and then offered bond in exchange 
for their land.”148 
Appalachia evolved into what some scholars call an “internal colony” 
or a “sacrifice zone,” which was “created to provide cheap resources to fuel 
the rest of the country.” 149  Companies dominated land ownership and 
isolated communities from penetration by other industries. 150  Through 
isolating people and dispossessing them of land, coal companies sought to 
turn local residents “into a docile workforce” that lived and breathed 
extractive work, residing in company towns and coal camps and paid in 
“scrip” instead of money.151 While company towns are no longer the norm, 
the effects of these relationships are still felt in Appalachia today. Yet this 
was all in the name of “the greater good,”152 with fossil fuel communities 
serving as the nation’s cheap energy powerhouse.153 
Serving as the nation’s energy powerhouse has been costly. For 
decades, coal miners have lost their lives in and because of the mines.154 
Some of these deaths were in major disasters that caught the public’s 
attention, but most of them were a regular procession of daily accidents and 
health harms.155 These hazards are not a phenomenon of history, either. 
“Between 1996 and 2005, nearly 10,000 miners died of black lung 
 
 144. See, e.g., discussion infra Section IV.C about Native American community in mixed 
environmental justice/economic dependency relationship with coal-fired power plant. 
 145. Ann M. Eisenberg, Beyond Science and Hysteria: Reality and Perceptions of Environmental 
Justice Concerns Surrounding Marcellus and Utica Shale Gas Development, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 183, 
199 (2015); see also Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119. 
 146. Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119. 
 147. Id. 
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 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 120. 
 152. Lofaso, supra note 143, at 88. 
 153. Bell & York, supra note 40, at 119–20. 
 154. Lofaso, supra note 143, at 89. 
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disease.”156 As of this writing, black lung rates have in fact been rising.157  
Yet the costs have not been limited to miners themselves. Residents living 
near mountaintop removal sites suffer high rates of disease and morbidity.158 
In addition to compromised health and safety, residents of fossil fuel 
communities have seen the destruction of irreplaceable cultural and 
ecological resources, as well as entrenched poverty and limited economic 
alternatives.159 
Yet throughout the evolution of this exploitative dynamic, these 
relationships were encouraged and actively supported by the rest of the 
country through law and policy, evolving with the knowledge and 
acquiescence of the larger political body despite intermittent recognition of 
Appalachian problems. When coal miners sought to improve their conditions 
in the early twentieth century, federal actors intervened on behalf of 
companies.160 In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court 
sanctioned mine operators’ power to contract with workers to prevent 
unionization.161  In the 1921 Battle of Blair Mountain, the United States 
Army intervened to stop an uprising of miners, after which the Army left 
West Virginia to resolve the conflict internally, much to the detriment of the 
miners.162 Black lung, a “chronicle of a preventable disease that was not 
prevented,” was ignored by state and federal public health authorities for 
most of the twentieth century “[d]espite the fact that physicians working 
among coal miners in the nineteenth century recognized and called attention 
to . . . [this] public health disaster.” 163  These egregious conditions 
notwithstanding, throughout the twentieth century, tax incentives and 
subsidies to the fossil fuel industry became a part of law.164 As of 2017, the 
federal government continued to support fossil fuel production with $14.7 
billion in subsidies, and state governments provided a total of $5.8 billion in 
incentives.165 
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Meanwhile, coal communities’ suffering was not unknown. Congress 
made a show of helping Appalachian residents with measures such as the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”). Yet SMCRA 
“has fallen far short of its potential;”166 indeed, with provisions providing for 
oversight by states known to be dominated by industry,167 it could hardly be 
deemed an earnest effort to remedy Appalachian suffering. Similarly, the 
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1973 nominally addressed black lung, only to 
help a mere 7.6% of claimants in “a system that miners, unable to attract 
attorneys and financially incapable of matching the coal companies’ 
development of medical evidence, wholeheartedly despise[d] as unjust.”168 
U.S. society thus has a decades-long tradition of propping up the fossil 
fuel industry and acquiescing in its creation of exploitative mono-economies. 
Viewed in this light, workers’ and communities’ anticipation or hope that 
support might continue for their sole economic lifeline seems less 
unreasonable than if one views that anticipation standing alone in the context 
of today’s changed markets, or viewed through the lens of communities with 
more resources or alternative options.169 The argument that fossil fuels are 
harmful and that people simply have to find other jobs overlooks a 
longstanding history of exploitation and isolation, an abusive tradition from 
which the majority has benefited. A swift, unmitigated shift away from these 
industries stands to exacerbate the injustices that fossil fuel communities 
have already experienced. The transition has, in fact, already begun, and 
fossil fuel communities have not fared well.170 Coal country has already lost 
a substantial portion of employment opportunities, and with those lost jobs 
have come lost tax resources, businesses, population, and spirit.171 
One might argue that this is the nature of economic developments: 
markets change and workers and communities who bear the losses of those 
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transitions must adapt, evolve, and potentially relocate. Yet attempts to 
distinguish between the public and private spheres in this context ring 
hollow. First, fossil fuel workers and communities have been engaged in 
what should be characterized as quasi-public activity. 172  While their 
contributions to the nation’s energy supply were through direct relationships 
with private companies, those companies were empowered by the public. 
The workers’ and communities’ labor and losses fueled a public electricity 
grid and provided fundamental public benefits for which they bore 
immeasurable externalized costs. 
Second, one would be hard-pressed to disentangle the diverse public 
and private factors that converge to shape discrete sectors, especially in the 
energy context.173 Many have pointed to the cheapness of natural gas as a 
driving force undermining the coal industry in order to suggest that coal’s 
decline is a private phenomenon not warranting mitigation.174  However, 
Congress’s decision to impose minimal regulations on the natural gas 
industry was an intentional public policy development that shaped the status 
quo in foreseeable ways.175 
These circumstances illustrate that, if nothing else, principles of fairness 
and equity weigh in favor of a just transition for these communities. Yet these 
principles also implicate some of the basic premises of our legal system. 
Communities’ expectations and reliance have been encouraged, even 
coerced, through law and policy. While formal legal avenues have been of 
little help to them—to demand, for instance, the delayed closure of a plant, 
collective compensation for environmental degradation to the region, or 
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meaningful assistance with the black lung pandemic—the ethical impetus to 
help these communities transcends a mere nicety. 
Several lines of scholarship have insisted upon the materiality of 
expectations at the community level. Joseph Sax was concerned with 
community reliance and formal property law’s silence on communities.176 
He argued “that the law offered no opportunity even to raise a question about 
the non-economic losses incurred when an established community is 
destroyed . . . for ‘just compensation’ includes only the value of the 
economic interests taken.”177 He noted that:  
there is a widespread sense that community is important, and a willingness 
exists to protect community interests; yet there is no principle or doctrine 
to which to turn in those cases where, for whatever reasons, the people 
affected are unable to generate the political support necessary to induce an 
act of grace.178  
Sax argued that “[t]he idea of justice at the root of private property 
protections calls for identification of those expectations which the legal 
system ought to recognize,” including at the community level.179 
The concern for community reliance evokes the related concern that 
frustrated expectations can lead to social instability and political upheaval.180 
For instance, Sax argued that the public trust doctrine was not merely a 
state’s obligation to conserve natural resources, as many understand it, but is 
also a means of marrying customs with formal law in order to respect 
common expectations and ward off social unrest.181 
This line of thinking seems to suggest that where formal law fails to 
recognize the meaningful nature of coal communities’ reliance upon their 
way of life, the lens of first principles illuminates the way of life as 
meaningful and worth respecting. The reasons for undermining that way of 
life seem meaningful too. Fossil fuel communities have already been 
sacrificed for the sake of collective progress through their energy production 
activities. They stand to be sacrificed anew if their majoritarian-encouraged 
dependency relationships are ignored in the transition to clean energy, as 
state and federal policy drivers continue to curtail or undermine these 
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communities’ economic activities in the name of collective progress.182  
While the majority’s willingness to destroy coal communities’ 
dependency relationships is not a “takings,” it nonetheless raises the prospect 
of a discrete minority being sacrificed for “the greater good”—an approach 
to progress that legal ethicists have considered at best morally 
questionable.183 Indeed, when federal legislators passed provisions of the 
Trade Act of 1974 to offset displacement caused by reduced restrictions on 
trade,184  one decisionmaker reasoned, “much as the doctrine of eminent 
domain requires compensation when private property is taken for public 
use,” increased fair trade required compensation to displaced workers.185 
“Otherwise the costs of a federal policy [of free trade] that conferred benefits 
on the nation as a whole would be imposed on a minority of American 
workers.”186 
It might be suggested that Appalachia and other carbon-dependent 
communities are not unique in their situation. Workers in the United States 
are often displaced and left vulnerable for a variety of reasons including 
changes in technology, new trade regimes, other policy developments, or the 
absence of legal protections.187 This comparison is worthwhile. The story of 
Appalachia, while unique in some respects, shares many analogies, as with 
tenants and sharecroppers who were displaced by the mechanization of the 
cotton harvest, plant employees who lost manufacturing jobs when 
businesses moved overseas, and aerospace workers who were displaced 
during the 1990s with the end of the cold war, to name some examples.188 
The question becomes one of drawing lines. Where takings analyses stop, 
economic transitions begin. We ask people to bear the costs of the latter, not 
the former, and by not recognizing property interests in work,189 we disfavor 
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the property-less in decisions as to who receives compensation.190  
This line-drawing may make sense. Otherwise, it could become cost-
prohibitive to pass new laws. Yet certain factors weigh in favor of 
contemplating either more effective transitional policies or more robust 
baseline protections for workers and communities. First, as technology 
continues to evolve and render more work obsolete, the future will be replete 
with ongoing displacement.191 As more and more people and professions are 
displaced, it seems unrealistic to assume that the supply of work will match 
the demand for it. Second, the egregious ramifications of the transition away 
from coal indicate that asking those workers and communities to bear the 
losses, adapt, and relocate has simply not worked for a substantial segment 
of those communities. While such a proposed allocation of losses may make 
sense in theory, in practice, the result has been poverty, deaths of despair, 
and regional stagnation.192 
To be clear, none of this discussion is intended to suggest that deep 
decarbonization should not be pursued as swiftly and effectively as possible. 
The question of livelihoods should not hold the broader community hostage 
to the dire fate associated with a failure to reduce carbon emissions 
adequately.193 This is also not a call for some form of reparations, especially 
considering other communities, such as indigenous populations and the 
descendants of slaves, whose under-acknowledged exploitation also fueled 
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national wealth in even more dire ways. The argument is rather that fossil 
fuel communities have already borne loss after loss to the benefit of others. 
To ask them to bear yet another disproportionate loss in the clean-energy 
transition on behalf of the rest of society would be to effectuate yet another 
distributive injustice. In other words, these communities should not be 
forgotten in the decarbonization calculus. They deserve a just transition. 
C.  A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF JUST TRANSITIONS 
This Section explores a pragmatic and strategic argument in favor of 
embracing the just transition concept. In short, the United States is in urgent 
need of environmental and climate policy reform at the federal, state, and 
local levels. 194  Reform is often unachievable, however, because of 
entrenched political obstacles.195 This Section argues that the pursuit of law 
and policy informed by just transitions principles may be more achievable 
than more traditional modes of seeking environmental reform. 
Most scholars now agree that environmental reform had a zenith of 
sorts, and that the zenith has passed.196 The late 1960s and early 1970s saw 
the passage of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.197 Still today, these major federal 
statutes make up the foundation of the environmental legal apparatus. The 
reforms largely came out of a national social movement.198  Reacting to 
works such as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring199  and the incident of the 
Cuyahoga River catching fire,200 the public realized that their welfare in part 
depended upon some measure of environmental protection.201 
Sporadic successes have been achieved since the peak of environmental 
reform. As recently as 1993, Daniel Farber observed how 
environmentalism’s successes undermined the idea that interest groups could 
warp governmental policy through lobbying.202 He explained: 
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[A]ir pollution legislation benefits millions of people by providing them 
with clean air; it also imposes heavy costs on concentrated groups of firms. 
The theory predicts that the firms will organize much more effectively 
than the individuals, and will thereby block the legislation. We would also 
expect to find little regulation of other forms of pollution. Similarly, we 
would also expect firms to block legislation limiting their access to public 
lands. Thus, the two basic predictions are that environmental groups will 
not organize effectively and that environmental statutes will not be 
passed.203 
Yet Farber concluded that “the reality is quite different.” 204 
“Environmental groups manage to organize quite effectively. . . . . Nor, 
obviously, is there any dearth of federal environmental legislation.”205 He 
thus argued that “the political system manages to overcome the inherent 
advantages of special interests.”206 
A more recent article by the same author recognizes a largely different 
status quo, however. In his 2017 article, The Conservative as 
Environmentalist, Farber recognizes that interest groups do indeed now 
stand in the way of environmental reform.207 He suggests that conservatives’ 
shift away from moderate environmental sympathies over the past several 
decades can be explained by the “emergence of a coalition of disaffected 
westerners and business interests (particularly in the fossil-fuel industry) 
supported by an interlocking network of foundations, donors, and 
conservative-policy advocates.”208 
A movement does exist today that is not all that different from the 
environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s.209 Much of the American 
public is deeply concerned about climate change.210 The movements for 
climate reform and related principles, such as climate justice and energy 
justice, use activism, litigation, and lobbying to pursue much-needed 
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changes. 211  Many successes have been achieved. 212  Most commentators 
concede, however, that progress to date has simply been inadequate to ward 
off the disastrous effects of climate change.213 
Anti-environmental forces today seem to have become more powerful 
than in prior eras.214 The fossil fuel industry manages to undermine the 
environmental movement even at the grassroots level. 215  Pat McGinley 
describes, for example, the so-called “War on Coal” campaign, a massive, 
industry-financed public relations effort “buttressed by think-tank studies” 
that has successfully fueled public antipathy toward environmental 
regulations.216 According to sociologists Bell and York, despite its waning 
contributions to the economy and employment, the fossil fuel industry 
manages to “gain[] compliance from substantial segments of the public” by 
“actively construct[ing] ideology that furthers its interests.”217 
As the fossil fuel industry and conservative politicians have joined 
forces, labor and workers’ groups have often sided with them.218 According 
to sociologist Brian Obach, “workers are not typically the lead opponents of 
environmental measures.” 219  Rather, industry executives recruit workers 
with the threat of layoffs or total shutdowns of operations. In addition, as “a 
threat to corporate profits” is not particularly concerning to the public, 
workers also become the more sympathetic faces of environmental 
opposition.220 
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Commentators have observed the largely untapped potential of 
collaboration between environmental and labor groups. The longstanding 
“work-environment” rift often puzzles scholars. 221  While jobs-versus-
environment tensions serve to divide the two camps, other areas seem like 
they should be unifying—for instance, workplace safety, shared concerns 
about basic human needs, and as Doorey observes, the fact that both fields 
serve as checks on what would otherwise be “unbridled” corporate 
activity.222 
One explanation for the rift is environmentalism’s association with the 
middle class and upper middle class. In its early days, the environmental 
movement was spurred in large part based on a philosophy embracing a 
veneration for nature.223 As one activist articulates,  
environmental heroes like John Muir, Teddy Roosevelt, and Aldo 
Leopold—and the romanticizing of wilderness through art, poetry, essays, 
and music—created a catalyst for men to see communing with nature as a 
way of defining their manhood. Exploration, solitude, and game hunting 
became the foundation for saving and preserving nature. But for whom 
was nature being saved?224 
As the activist suggests, this philosophy arguably disregards the needs 
of society’s less privileged ranks, for instance, by failing to prioritize issues 
such as immediate access to clean drinking water, or being overly dismissive 
of livelihoods that depend on natural resources.225 Pruitt and Sobczynski 
have argued, for example, that poor, white rural residents may be seen as 
“trash[ing] pristine nature by their very presence.”226 
Yet, in the instances when labor and environmental groups have 
combined their efforts, these efforts have proven quite potent. Many attribute 
the passage of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act to a coalition 
between workers and environmental organizations. 227  A prior article, 
Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems, examined the 
fruitfulness of collaborative partnerships between ranchers and bird 
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conservationists on public lands.228 
Compared with the fossil fuel industry, then, the modern environmental 
movement has two problems: (1) a power problem and (2) a branding 
problem. Pursuing more aggressive, concerted appeals to labor interests 
could help address both of these problems. 
The power problem is evidenced in the modern environmental 
movement’s inability to penetrate the thick web of interest groups that 
benefit from impeding climate reform and other environmental measures.229 
The political process is indeed “dominated by the rent-seeking activities of 
special-interest groups.”230 Naturally, coalitions and alliances stand to fare 
better than interest groups that work alone. While outreach to the fossil fuel 
industry may involve mere tilting at windmills given the industry’s track 
record,231  labor and environments’ overlapping interests may have more 
potential to give climate advocates more allies and leverage. 
But further, joining forces with workers’ advocates could also help the 
environmental movement win more hearts and minds. As an example of why 
the branding of environmental reform matters, many conservatives said in 
one public opinion poll that they opposed the Obama administration’s Clean 
Power Plan because they thought it would cost people jobs. 232  If the 
environmental movement addressed the jobs concern directly and in 
coordination with labor advocates—which they could do by lobbying for 
reform through the lens of the just transition—they could proactively address 
one of the arguments against environmental reform. 
A potential concern in addressing work and labor more directly in 
environmental advocacy is that such efforts could result in sustaining 
livelihoods in hazardous industries and delaying much-needed 
environmental action. However, as discussed below, it is not necessarily 
contemplated that just transitions law and policy must entail actually 
sustaining hazardous industries; the more important principle is instead 
attempting to offset or mitigate some of the losses to livelihoods and 
communities as those industries’ activities are curtailed. Further, even if 
some compromises were to be made, it is worth considering whether the 
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movement risks letting the perfect be the enemy of the good, and whether 
compromise outcomes may still be preferable to substantively preferable 
outcomes indefinitely delayed by political obstacles.233 
III.  JUST TRANSITIONS AS LAW: FILLING IN THE CONTOURS 
This Part asks what are perhaps the most challenging questions 
surrounding the prospect of embracing just transitions in law and policy: 
What, exactly, does a just transition look like? Who deserves a just 
transition? What are the avenues for achieving it? 
A helpful starting point is the fact that the pursuit of just transitions is 
not entirely alien to United States law and policy. This Part therefore starts 
in Section III.A with a brief summary and critique of four of the most 
prominent instances when federal institutions have authorized transitional 
policy to address worker and community displacement: (1) the Trade Act of 
1974 providing assistance to manufacturing workers displaced by reduced 
restrictions on trade; (2) the President’s Northwest Forest Plan providing 
assistance to timber communities displaced by reductions in timbering on 
public lands; (3) the Tobacco Transition Payment Program assisting tobacco 
farmers displaced by public litigation against tobacco companies in the 
1990s; and (4) the Obama administration’s Partnerships for Opportunity and 
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (“POWER”) Initiative assisting 
coalfield communities in the face of coal’s decline. 
Interestingly, only two of the programs—the Forest Plan and 
POWER—have an explicit environmental component. This suggests that in 
practice, the understanding of just transitions has not been simply as a 
corollary to environmental progress. Rather, the consistent conditions among 
these scenarios are (1) a dependency relationship between a community and 
an industry that is (2) undermined by some public action, or perhaps in the 
case of coal, public inaction. Section III.B therefore also explores other, non-
environmental scenarios where just transitions may be warranted, such as the 
example of New York City taxi drivers being displaced by ride-sharing 
services, or of longstanding community residents facing displacement by 
gentrification. Section III.B also revisits the argument that the line between 
economic and legal transitions is often blurrier than some might suggest, 
indicating that a scenario should not necessarily require a clear act of direct 
public complicity in order to trigger a just transition.  
Section III.C discusses instances of locally-driven approaches to just 
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transitions and posits that these examples offer important insights alongside 
the federal programs, particularly since the federal programs have, as a 
whole, not been considered particularly successful (while the effects of the 
POWER Initiative remain to be seen as of this writing). Local land use 
planning processes and similar mechanisms help account for the complex, 
interconnecting factors that shape mono-economies’ dependency 
relationships. They thus may have benefits to offer as an alternative or 
complement to the standard practice of using federal agencies to implement 
transitional policy.  
Finally, Section III.D offers additional thoughts as to how and when 
just transitions should be pursued and who should pay for them. Yet this 
discussion again raises the question of whether transitional policy is the 
answer for worker and community vulnerability in the face of climate change 
or in other contexts, or whether more robust baseline protections may be the 
simpler, more efficient approach. This latter approach may also be the fairer, 
more inclusive one, in that transitional policy directs resources to workers 
who are losing “good jobs,” while other workers, particularly 
disproportionate numbers of women and people of color in the service 
industry, have benefited inequitably from such jobs in the first place. 
A.  FEDERAL TRANSITIONAL POLICIES 
1.  The Trade Act of 1974 
The Trade Act of 1962 established the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Program (“TAA”), while the Trade Act of 1974 gave birth to the modern 
program still operational today.234 The program has become a quid pro quo 
component of modern trade policy. That is, in order to open more trade 
avenues, more trade assistance for injured domestic workers is often a 
necessary political compensatory measure.235 
Crafted in the name of fairness, the program’s goal is to provide aid to 
workers who lose their jobs, hours of work, or wages because of increases in 
imports. 236  Congress was “of the view that fairness demanded some 
mechanism whereby the national public, which realizes an overall gain 
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through trade readjustments, can compensate the particular . . . workers who 
suffer a loss . . . .”237 Returning to the idea that certain forms of displacement 
are ethically similar to takings, even if not cognizable as such in law, a 
federal court observed that TAA was pursued in as “much as the doctrine of 
eminent domain requires compensation when private property is taken for 
public use. Otherwise the costs of a federal policy [of free trade] that 
conferred benefits on the nation as a whole would be imposed on a minority 
of American workers . . . .”238 
Individuals eligible under the program may file a petition to the U.S. 
Department of Labor within one year of losing work. 239  Once certified, 
workers are then eligible to apply for TAA program benefits, which are 
administered through state agencies.240 The benefits include “weekly cash 
benefits, job retraining, and allowances for job searches or relocation.”241 
“According to [2011] White House statistics, the average worker receiving 
benefits is a 46 year-old male with a high school education who is the 
primary breadwinner for his family and has worked for at least ten years at a 
factory that is closing.”242 
Since the program’s inception, however, studies have shown that trade 
adjustment benefits have simply not gone far enough to compensate 
displaced workers for their losses. In one survey of displaced shoe workers 
in the 1970s, researchers concluded that  
even if benefits were granted to a larger number of workers, each 
individual would be compensated for only a very small portion of his 
actual loss. The actual payments have been characterized by organized 
labor as band-aid treatment, because the subsequent wage loss as well as 
the many nonmonetary losses from displacement are not directly 
addressed.243  
 More recently, economist Lori Kletzer found that almost forty percent 
 
 237. Int’l Union, UAW v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 238. Id. 
 239. 19 U.S.C. § 2271 (2012); Petition Filing Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR (Aug. 31, 2018), https://doleta.gov/tradeact/petitioners/FAQ_Answers.cfm#G4. 
 240. Investing in Trade-Affected Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://doleta.gov/tradeact/petitioners/petitionprocess.cfm; see also BENJAMIN COLLINS, CONG. RES. 
SERV.  TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FOR WORKERS AND THE TAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2015 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44153.pdf (“Individual benefits are funded by the federal 
government and administered by state agencies through their workforce systems and unemployment 
insurance systems.”). 
 241. Rogers, supra note 184, at 568. 
 242. Id. at 568–69. 
 243. Malcolm Bale & John Mutti, Income Losses, Compensation, and International Trade, 13 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 278, 283–84 (1978). 
  
316 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:273 
of displaced workers did not find new jobs within one to two years after a 
job loss resulting from increased competition. 244  Another economist 
described trade assistance programs as “a collection of ad hoc, out-of-date, 
and inadequate programs that provide too little assistance too late to those in 
need.” 245  Legal scholars—who tend to treat TAA as a component of 
international trade law—have also critiqued trade adjustment assistance 
programs. Some deem TAA “a grave failure,” for reasons including “failures 
at the administrative and state levels, to Federal incompetence, to lack of 
resources and outreach for displaced workers,” as well as the inadequacy of 
judicial review available for workers unfairly denied assistance.246 Its flaws 
notwithstanding, many agree that the program is preferable to not offering 
assistance at all and that reforms may stand to improve it.247 
2.  The President’s Northwest Forest Plan 
The President’s Northwest Forest Plan (“NWFP”) was formed in the 
aftermath of a 1992 decision in which the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Washington imposed an injunction prohibiting over 66,000 acres 
of timber from being harvested on Washington public lands because of 
dangers the harvesting posed to the northern spotted owl. 248  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this and a series of related decisions.249 The 
Clinton administration then developed the NWFP, aimed toward enhancing 
conservation in the region. In 1994, the Forest Service and the Bureau of 
Land Management adopted the NWFP.250 
The circumstances surrounding the NWFP’s enactment were famously 
contentious.251 This scenario is at times considered a classic case study of 
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“jobs versus environment.” Timber harvesters were outraged based on the 
perception that the habitat of a single species should wield such an impact 
on their livelihoods. Predictions of “economic devastation” followed the 
court decisions, with fears of “a new ‘Appalachia in the Northwest.’”252 
Environmentalists, meanwhile, saw the decisions as a necessary 
conservation win. 
The economic concerns were not fictional. According to one 
commentator, “[n]o economic analysis [could] ignore the suffering of some 
rural communities, which [bore] the brunt of the economic pain associated 
with reduced federally subsidized timber supplies.”253 When the injunction 
issued, it threw “between 60,000 and 100,000 people out of work.”254 The 
NWFP sought to address some of this pain: 
[It] extend[ed] assistance to workers and communities, payments to 
counties to compensate for reduced income, removal of tax incentives for 
the export of raw logs, and assistance to encourage growth and investment 
of small businesses and secondary manufacturing. Similarly, the 
Economic Adjustment Initiative . . . provided over $550 million to aid 
communities and individuals affected by reduced timber harvests.255 
The NWFP also illustrates the causal complexity of factors that 
influence regional decline. Because of automation, “many jobs in the 
federally subsidized timber industry were on their way out long before the 
owl was listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act.” 256 
Generally, “rural areas dependent on the federal land-based timber industry” 
were not faring as well as other regions as of the 1990s.257 Nonetheless, 
federal actors saw fit to intervene in this scenario involving mixed 
technological, economic, and legal factors contributing to the decline.258 
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The NWFP “never truly satisfied the warring factions, the timber 
industry and the environmentalists.” 259  However, it was considered an 
achievement for the Clinton administration.260 Much analysis of the NWFP’s 
implementation has focused on its ecological successes. Yet, in all, “the 
NWFP has been more successful in stopping actions thought to be harmful 
to conservation . . . than it has been in promoting active restoration and 
adaptive management and in implementing economic and social policies set 
out under the plan.”261 
The NWFP provided for “payments to timber-dependent counties 
suffering from cutbacks” due to the law’s implementation in 2000.262 Since 
the NWFP’s implementation, counties formerly dependent on timber 
harvests for tax revenues have received millions of dollars.263 Today, many 
of these counties are considered to be “in crisis” because of curtailments in 
direct federal subsidies.264 The NWFP was criticized as failing to “provide 
long-term economic growth and security” for former timber counties.265 
3.  The Tobacco Transition Payment Program 
The tobacco industry has several unique quirks, but the parallels 
between the tobacco industry and the fossil fuel industry are notable. Both 
industries have invested aggressively in science-denial and public relations 
initiatives, both have rendered entire communities dependent upon them, and 
both have seen major shifts in public awareness contribute to their decline.266 
In addition to increased anti-tobacco sentiment and knowledge of health 
risks among the public, a mass tort action against tobacco companies in the 
1990s brought them to the brink of extinction—which perhaps signifies a 
parallel to ongoing climate-related litigation against fossil fuel companies.267 
Because of the economic hardships associated with decreased tobacco 
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demand and government pushback against the tobacco industry, in the late 
1990s, a settlement between states and large tobacco companies provided for 
billions of dollars of economic assistance to be paid to tobacco farmers.268 
The ten-year Tobacco Transition Payment Program (“TTPP”) was created to 
“ease tobacco farmers’ worries” and give them “time to diversify their crop 
to include other commodities separate from tobacco, or to allow 
[them] . . . to cease planting tobacco altogether.” 269  The TTPP also 
terminated a federal price-fixing program that had supported tobacco farmers 
since the 1930s.270  
The TTPP is often referred to as a “buy-out” program.271  However, the 
term is somewhat misleading because farmers were not necessarily paid to 
stop growing tobacco.272 Tobacco producers received government assistance 
by signing up for the TTPP through the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Commodity Credit Corporation, which “provide[d] payments to tobacco 
quota holders who voluntarily enter[ed] into appropriate contracts with the 
government”273—including for the cessation of tobacco production.274 The 
TTPP provided eligible producers with ten equal annual payments “designed 
to transition tobacco producers into a free market for their produce.”275 
 The program’s effects were mixed and may be the subject of debate. 
The number of tobacco farmers was reduced dramatically just after 
deregulation was implemented.276  Each participating farmer received on 
average a total of approximately $17,000 over the course of the program, 
while 75% of payments went to the top ten percent of farms.277 Some have 
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suggested that these payments offered important “injections of cash” for 
struggling rural communities.278 On the other hand, the program may have 
had the effect of shackling some farmers to their crops involuntarily, as many 
were “unable to break free of the cycle of debt” associated with restructured 
relationships. 279  Some farmers, in response to the program, actually 
expanded their production of tobacco.280  
 The TTPP model may have some lessons to offer just transitions law 
and policy. The fact that the TTPP helped transition workers and 
communities away from a production activity that had been publicly 
subsidized for decades, with minimal public attention or controversy, seems 
like a success. At the very least, the TTPP recognized that the political 
majority was complicit in fostering farmers’ dependency on the hazardous 
activity through national legislative intervention since the 1930s, and 
complicit in undermining that dependency relationship.  
On the other hand, the TTPP model’s slow-sunsetting approach may 
stand in direct tension with the urgency associated with decarbonization. It 
also seemed to rely somewhat on tobacco farmers’ capacity for autonomous 
decisionmaking over their own production activities, which may not apply 
to many other scenarios or address regional economic dependencies with 
necessary robustness.  
4.  The POWER Initiative  
In 2016, the Obama administration announced a nearly forty million 
dollar program for twenty economic and workforce development projects to 
assist communities affected by changes in the coal and power industry.281 
The POWER Initiative was a joint effort involving ten federal agencies with 
the goal of either creating or retaining several thousand jobs, in addition to 
broader economic development, such as economic diversification, attracting 
new sources of investment, and providing workforce services and skills 
training. Through the POWER Initiative, the Appalachian Regional 
Commission (“ARC”) and other agencies have received over $100 million 
in appropriations to assist displaced coal workers.282 
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For instance, the ARC alone has received $50 million from Congress 
since 2016 in order to: 
target federal resources to help communities and regions that have been 
affected by job losses in coal mining, coal power plant operations, and 
coal-related supply chain industries due to the changing economics of 
America’s energy production. To date, ARC has invested $94 million in 
projects serving 250 coal impacted counties. These projects are expected 
to create or retain 8,800 jobs, train 25,400 workers or students, and 
leverage an additional $210 million to the Region.283  
ARC receives applications for funding from local governments, states, 
other political subdivisions, non-profit organizations, and institutions of 
higher education.284 As of this writing, little commentary has assessed the 
program’s outcomes. The proposed POWER Plus Plan, meanwhile, focused 
on more direct assistance to workers; yet it and similar proposals have failed 
to make their way through Congress.285 
B.  SYNTHESIZING FEDERAL TRANSITIONAL POLICIES 
Several themes emerge from the programs above. These themes 
illuminate the conditions that have been considered appropriate for 
triggering intervention in pursuit of a just transition. These programs’ 
strengths and weaknesses in design and implementation can also inform 
future efforts. 
The first theme is that policymakers have implemented transitional 
policy when there is foreseeable, widespread displacement to workers as the 
result of some form of public action. Embedded in the foreseeable 
displacement is the existence of some kind of dependency relationship or 
longstanding regional mono-economy. This theme may explain why 
transitional support beyond unemployment benefits is not specifically 
provided when a sector like Blockbuster goes out of business: unlike with 
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each of the sectors above, there are no company towns or regions where 
substantial portions of the population have been employed at Blockbuster for 
decades. 
Critically, though, the programs do not require some sort of showing 
that a loss is the proximate result of an intentional public act. In fact, the 
Trade Act of 1974 specifically undid such a requirement imposed by the 
1962 Act. The 1962 Act required that increased imports were the “major 
cause” of beneficiaries’ unemployment. 286  Yet it became clear shortly 
thereafter that most workers simply would not be able to meet such a 
burden.287 One reason for the absence of a causality requirement is that 
economic and legal transitions in the United States are fundamentally 
entangled. Further, the absence of regulations may affect transitions in 
similar ways as the creation of regulations. As discussed above, 
commentators often point to the cheapness of natural gas as the “real” reason 
for the coal industry’s decline; yet Congress could easily have chosen to 
regulate natural gas more stringently or otherwise intervene into energy 
markets.  
One weakness, at least with the NWFP and TAA, is that neither is 
considered to have achieved successful economic mitigation in the face of 
the loss being addressed. One reason for this may be that directing large aid 
packages to benefits such as relocation assistance will inevitably be a “band-
aid” approach if those packages do not address the root cause of workers’ 
and communities’ vulnerability. The root cause is the development of the 
dependency relationship or mono-economy in the first place. In this sense, it 
is possible that federal actors—unless they create a New Deal-style form of 
transitional employment themselves—may be too detached from regional 
realities to meaningfully reshape a region. Similarly, the very nature of these 
programs may reflect a “too little, too late” approach to addressing 
longstanding histories of regional under-investment. The TTPP may have 
been more successful in part because many tobacco farmers were near 
retirement anyway, few depended solely on tobacco-farming income, and 
tobacco farmers may have been better able to exercise control over their own 
economic activities as compared to laid-off manufacturing or timber 
workers.288  
The second problem with these programs is that as jobs like timbering 
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and mining decline, no comparably lucrative, low-skill jobs are, in fact, 
available as alternatives for displaced workers. The three main traditional 
rural livelihoods—natural resource extraction, manufacturing, and 
farming—have declined dramatically.289 The sectors that have taken their 
place are lower-paying positions in the service industry.290 These positions 
lack the security, culture, and regional influence of the traditional 
livelihoods. Transitional policy geared toward moving a worker from a 
traditional livelihood to a modern one will almost inevitably be moving that 
worker a step down in the world of work. In turn, the region may be fated to 
suffer, as each individual experiences a loss in wages and security, 
effectuating ripple effects on local tax coffers.  
The POWER Initiative does align with this Article’s theoretical 
discussion of how a just transition should be defined. The program’s focus 
on diverse forms of regional stakeholders and initiatives may make it better 
poised to succeed than programs focused more heavily on one approach, 
such as worker retraining or providing direct subsidies to local governments. 
Yet it is not clear that POWER is adequate to address the likely-intensified 
losses anticipated to be associated with deep decarbonization. 
In any case, these programs indicate that circumstances triggering just 
transitions are not limited to what is arguably the perfect case study of the 
coalfield community. The case of the New York City taxi drivers illustrates 
yet another scenario where workers formed a longstanding dependency 
relationship with one industry; their industry performed a quasi-public 
function; and the public’s failure to act left the workers vulnerable to an 
abrupt collapse of their industry, leaving them without meaningful 
alternatives. As with manufacturing or mining jobs, taxi drivers, once part of 
a lucrative, regulated community, were suddenly in competition with options 
that were cheaper, faster, and less secure in the form of app-directed ride-
sharing services.291 Many drivers had invested their life savings in coveted 
taxi medallions, the value of which dropped dramatically due to the rise of 
Uber and Lyft. Six driver suicides over the course of six months in 2018 
brought the City’s attention to this community’s struggle. 292  As of this 
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writing, “New York’s city council is poised to approve a one-year cap on 
new licenses for Uber . . . and other ride-sharing vehicles as part of a 
sweeping package of regulations intended to reduce traffic and halt the 
downward slide in drivers’ pay.”293 
Just transitions considerations also seem relevant to communities 
displaced by gentrification. In those instances, the community has developed 
a dependency relationship on an existing way of life. This way of life could 
have relied, in fact, on a history of under-investment, the absence of industry, 
or a mix of industries that are not necessarily lucrative. When more lucrative 
industries arrive to take advantage of that history of under-investment—
bringing with them wealthier residents and higher home and goods prices—
political inaction in the face of the communities’ vulnerability to 
displacement may be an analogous version of an unjust transition.294 
The next Section looks at alternatives, or potential complements, to 
federal aid packages in transitional programs. It posits that locally-driven 
transitions may stand to more meaningfully untangle the diverse issues at 
play in a mono-economy or dependency relationship. This more intimate 
process could in turn wield more benefits in shaping regional economic fates. 
C.  LOCALLY-DRIVEN TRANSITIONS 
Alan Ramo and Deborah Behles examined the experience of Navajo 
and Hopi communities with the Mohave Generating Station along the 
Nevada-Arizona border in the late 1990s and early 2000s.295 Their case study 
provides an illustration of a scenario in which local actors addressed the 
impending cessation of hazardous industrial activity that a community also 
depended upon economically. 
The U.S. Department of the Interior decided in the early nineteenth 
century that the Mohave Station would receive its coal and water from 
nearby Hopi and Navajo reservations. 296  This decision commenced a 
longstanding exploitative relationship that gave Native groups little control 
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over their coal and water resources.297 For years, both Hopi and Navajo 
tribes advocated to set aside the original decree, protesting highly 
undervalued royalties they received for use of their coal and water.298 Yet 
the communities also depended on the royalties, as well as the fact that about 
250 Navajo were employed at Mohave’s mine.299 
In 1998, two environmental groups sued Mohave’s owners, alleging 
violations of Clean Air Act emissions limits, compliance orders, and 
reporting requirements; simultaneously, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency concluded that the plant posed a risk to visibility in the Grand 
Canyon.300  Thus began the transition toward the closure of the Mohave 
Plant, which risked leaving the native communities in even worse 
circumstances than before, despite the closure’s likely environmental 
benefits. 
The Mohave plant was closed in 2006.301 It was not closed because of 
environmental hazards, but because it was no longer cost-effective—which 
again raises the question of untangling the causal factors that trigger the need 
for a just transition. The communities were “devastated by Mohave’s 
operation,” but also devastated by its closure.302 
Issues concerning the plant arose in another proceeding around the 
same time, however, where Mohave’s former owner, Southern California 
Edison, was involved in a rate case with the California Public Utilities 
Commission (“CPUC”).303 Local groups formed an organization called the 
“Just Transition Coalition” in order to intervene in the proceeding. The 
coalition was an “alliance of environmental and grassroots Native American 
interests including the Indigenous Environmental Network, Black Mesa 
Trust, Black Mesa Water coalition, To’ Nizhoni Ani, Grand Canyon Trust, 
and the Sierra Club.”304 The coalition intervened “to demand that the CPUC 
allocate funds from the sale of Acid Rain SO2 allowances, which were an 
unneeded windfall if Mohave remained closed, to help transition the Hopi 
and Navajo communities to cleaner energy alternatives.” 305  The group 
emphasized that a transition that invested in the communities “was equitable 
due to Mohave’s operation and closure’s devastating economic and social 
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impacts and decades of . . . subsidized cheap coal power.”306  The CPUC 
then ordered Mohave’s former owner to set aside acid rain allowances to be 
disbursed in the future.307 
The process of transitioning the communities away from their 
dependency relationship with the plant involved “years of mediation, 
workshops, and litigation,” which resulted in the Hopi and Navajo agreeing 
with the Just Transition Coalition that revenues should be used to incentivize 
renewable energy generation. 308  The CPUC, relying on its authority to 
“exercise equitable jurisdiction as an incident to its express duties” to 
regulate utilities in its jurisdiction, as well as California’s Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, decided “to disburse the allowance revenues to 
incentivize renewable generation that benefited Hopi and Navajo 
communities.”309 
While the procedural evolution of this case study may appear to be a 
unique or idiosyncratic approach to a just transition, it offers lessons for 
pursuing just transitions elsewhere. Ramo and Behles argued that this 
scenario “presents a roadmap for other states to consider creative solutions 
to help communities transition away from fossil-fuel generation.”310 As of 
this writing, many commentators seem to view the Mohave transition as a 
success story.311 
The Mohave process in fact mirrors several procedural models that can 
be embodied in law and policy in different ways. First, it resembles new 
governance. According to new governance theory, diverse stakeholders must 
be involved in decisionmaking, where traditional networks and hierarchies 
are emphasized less, and the exchange of information and pursuit of win-win 
solutions are emphasized more.312 More traditionally, though, this process 
resembles land use planning processes, which also involve bringing 
stakeholders together to pursue collaborative decisionmaking. 313 
Administrative law and policy can provide for mechanisms that facilitate 
communities’ ability to pursue these processes. 
Diverse local and state jurisdictions in the United States and 
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internationally are in the process of approaching transitions in different 
ways. In 2008, the State of Kentucky passed a tax incentive to attract new 
employers to the region.314 The struggling coal town of Hazard, Kentucky, 
has developed a former surface mine site into a research and testing facility 
for drone companies, while also offering new skills courses through the local 
community college.315 The Canadian province of Alberta has earmarked $40 
million to help approximately 2,000 workers, who are “losing their jobs as 
the province transitions away from thermal coal mines and coal-fired power 
plants over the next decade,” by providing “tuition vouchers, retraining 
programs, and on-site transitioning advice.”316 These varying approaches 
indicate that the ideal model for pursuing a just transition may be context-
specific. At least, as much of the global community seeks to transition to 
low-carbon energy emissions in the coming years, more success stories and 
replicable models should emerge. 
The Mohave study suggests that certain conditions may be conducive 
to a more transformative transition than an approach focused more narrowly 
on a measure such as worker retraining. These conditions include equal 
bargaining power among stakeholders, stakeholders with adequate 
resources, and a procedural mechanism to pursue a long-term 
decisionmaking or dispute resolution process. An effort toward transition 
that is more transformative also must involve some iterative 
decisionmaking—the “messiness” often associated with successful 
stakeholder collaboration—rather than single instances of legislative reform. 
Appropriate venues could be state, local, or federal administrative agencies, 
local governments, and courts. 
The Mohave study also shows how a just transitions policy can, and 
often should, be pursued in tandem with remedies for a history of 
environmental injustice. Many communities that depend upon high-carbon 
industries have also been harmed by them; many communities harmed by 
high-carbon industries have not benefited economically at all. Yet the choice 
of remedy does not pose an “either/or” choice between remedying 
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environmental injustice or remedying just transitions. A holistic, democratic 
process can account for both past harms and future risks. 
D.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PURSUING JUST TRANSITIONS 
A pressing question in the pursuit of just transitions policy is, who pays 
for just transitions? More specifically, why should the public pay and not the 
employers who have left these regions and workers vulnerable? 
The discussion in this Article is primarily concerned with public options 
for facilitating collective transitions. It is presumed that employers will often 
not be in a position to facilitate just transitions themselves. First—consistent 
with the above-mentioned concerns about interest groups—accountability 
for fossil fuel companies has been elusive.317 Congress has virtually declined 
to regulate the natural gas industry, for example.318 Second, many employers 
have become insolvent, as evidenced by the spate of coal companies that 
have filed for bankruptcy in recent years.319 
Nonetheless, future research should address the prospect of employer 
involvement in just transitions law and policy, especially where employers 
have knowingly pursued hazardous industrial activity to society’s detriment. 
In addition to tobacco companies’ involvement in funding the TTPP program 
described in Section III.A.3, a starting point for this consideration would be 
the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (the 
“WARN Act”). 
The WARN Act “was enacted in 1988 in response to the rash of plant 
closings and layoffs that had occurred in the immediately preceding 
years.”320 It sought “to enable workers, their families, and local community 
leaders sufficient time to prepare for mass layoffs or plant closures.”321 It 
“obligates employers to provide at least 60-days notice to employees and 
local government officials of a covered plant closure or mass layoff.”322 The 
Act covers employers who plan to lay off fifty or more employees during 
any thirty-day period, excluding part-time employees. 
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The WARN Act has been heavily criticized. Not only does it do little 
for workers and communities beyond providing a strikingly brief notice 
period before entire communities may be upended, but it also was deemed 
“imprecise, vague, difficult to interpret, and . . . may be very difficult to 
apply sensibly to particular fact situations.”323 But the idea could be helpful. 
Perhaps a modernized WARN Act of just transitions law and policy would 
require six to twelve months’ notice and options for assisting workers to 
retrain and relocate, for example. 
Finally, perhaps the real concern underlying the justice or injustice of 
transitions is not about transitions at all. Measures such as guaranteed 
employment or universal basic income, for example, would preclude the 
need to manufacture new regional or sectoral economies in anticipation of 
the ebb and flow of industries. A more robust baseline of worker and 
community support would make the vulnerability associated with transitions 
less dire and help preclude difficult decisions as to who should win and lose 
in the distribution of benefits and burdens. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of climate change, legal scholars should embrace the just 
transition as an equitable principle of easing the burden decarbonization 
poses to workers and communities who depend on carbon-heavy industries. 
Embracing this definition will be clarifying, will allow legal scholarship to 
engage with other fields and institutions that already recognize this 
definition, and will give the labor movement its due for originating the term. 
In turn, the concept finds support in important principles relevant to the 
environmental condition today, such as the need to account for complex 
social-ecological systems, to address jobs-versus-environment tensions, and 
to better consider economic equity. In short, if scholars and policymakers 
embrace the just transition concept, it stands to serve principles of economic 
equity, it might help make climate reform more achievable through coalition-
building, and it is poised to bring environmental law more in line with the 
needs of the climate era. 
Yet the just transition concept bears relevance to diverse scenarios 
where workers and communities face large-scale displacement from the 
longstanding industries on which they have relied. The moral impetus to help 
in the face of displacement may be the strongest where a public initiative is 
the clear cause of the displacement. This scenario is the most analogous to 
the state’s use of eminent domain, where the “taking” of something is 
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compensated because a discrete group is not asked to bear the costs of an 
initiative pursued for the greater good. While one might suggest that workers 
and communities should bear the costs of such displacement as the natural 
price of regulation, U.S. transitional policy illustrates prominent instances 
where Congress was compelled to intervene. 
The cause of displacement is often unclear, however. Our economic and 
legal evolutions tend to be intertwined. Thus, transitional policy may still be 
warranted where the cause of the displacement is less clear than the obvious, 
and relatively rare, “job-killing” law. Further, even if purely private forces 
caused large-scale displacement, considerations of fairness, compassion, and 
equity suggest it is the wrong choice to simply leave workers in the lurch 
where they lack other alternatives, or where their work contributed a public 
or quasi-public function—especially if, as Mazzocchi articulated and as is 
the case with fossil fuel workers, that work was particularly hazardous. This 
calculus does yield inherent problems with line-drawing. As an alternative, 
measures such as universal basic income or other provisions of a more robust 
social safety net could preclude the need to pick winners and losers in these 
scenarios. 
Given federal agencies’ track record of failing to sustainably untangle 
regional dependency relationships, to adequately offset workers’ and 
communities’ losses, or to nurture forward-looking economic diversification 
for regions and sectors in decline, it may be time to question whether federal 
agencies are indeed the most appropriate forum for large-scale transitional 
policy. It is possible that the largely-untested POWER Initiative uses novel 
substantive approaches that may not repeat the mistakes of past policies. 
Processes driven by state and local institutions and stakeholders may allow 
for a more involved, context-specific approach that can help better address 
the challenges associated with historical mono-economies. Additional 
research can help illuminate the best mechanisms for achieving just 
transitions in practice, especially as the clean-energy transition gains 
momentum. Perhaps most importantly, when environmental decisions are 
made, just transitions can and should be among values decisionmakers seek 
to harmonize. 
 
